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interventions in the climate system with the objective of offsetting 
anthropogenic climate change. The moral reasons in favour of and  
against R&D into and deployment of CE methods are analysed by  
means of argument maps. These argument maps provide an overview  
of the CE controversy and help to structure the complex debate. 
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prohibition; priority of mitigation policies. 
 
Gregor Betz is Juniorprofessor of Philosophy of Science at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology and head of the Shared Research Group „Limits 
and Objectivity of Scientific Foreknowledge: The Case of Energy Out-
looks (LOBSTER)“. Sebastian Cacean is research analyst and PhD student 































Ethical Aspects of Climate Engineering

Gregor Betz / Sebastian Cacean
Ethical Aspects of Climate Engineering






Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
KIT Scientific Publishing
Straße am Forum 2
D-76131 Karlsruhe
www.ksp.kit.edu
KIT – Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und nationales
Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft
Diese Veröffentlichung ist im Internet unter folgender Creative Commons-Lizenz 
publiziert: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/






Contents                                                                                            v	  
Preface                                                                                          vii	  
Summary 1	  
1	   Introduction 7	  
1.1	   Geoengineering – Climate Engineering 7	  
1.2	   An Introductory Note on Ethics 9	  
1.3	   Methods Applied 11	  
1.4	   How to Read Argument Maps 15	  
2	   The Macrostructure of the Overall Debate 17	  
3	   The Detailed Structure of the Sub-debates 23	  
3.1	   The Central Justification of R&D 23	  
3.2	   Side-effects of R&D 25	  
3.3	   Readiness for Deployment 29	  
3.3.1	   Lesser-evil Argumentation (Pro) 31	  
3.3.2	   Two-degree Target / 350 ppm Argumentation 
(Pro) 35	  
3.3.3	   Efficiency and Feasibility Considerations (Pro) 37	  
3.3.4	   Arguments from Ethics of Risk (Contra) 38	  
3.3.5	   Arguments from Justice and Fairness (Contra) 43	  
3.3.6	   Side-effects of Deployment (Contra) 45	  
3.3.7	   Geopolitical Objections (Contra) 46	  
3.3.8	   Critique of Technology and Civilization (Contra) 47	  
3.3.9	   Religious, Existentialist, and Environmental-ethics 
Arguments (Contra) 49	  
3.4	   Alternative Justifications of R&D 51	  
3.5	   Further Arguments 54	  
3.5.1	   Lack of R&D Alternatives 54	  
 vi 
3.5.2	   Direct Justifications of R&D Prohibition 56	  
3.5.3	   The Problem of National Bans 57	  
3.5.4	   Priority of Mitigation Policies 58	  
4	   Central Issues, Principles, and Problems 61	  
4.1	   Weighting of Side-effects 61	  
4.2	   Ethics of Risk: Possibilistic Predictions and the 
Precautionary Principle 63	  
4.3	   The Priority of Mitigation Policies 64	  
4.4	   The Entanglement of Moral and Extra-moral  
Arguments 66	  
4.5	   Fundamental Assumptions and Weltanschauung 68	  
5	   Coherent Positions and their Logico-argumentative 
Implications 73	  
5.1	   First Position: SRM is More Efficient than Mitigation 75	  
5.2	   Second Position: Disclosing the Risks of Ocean  
Fertilization 78	  
5.3	   Third Position: No SRM Development 81	  
5.4	   Fourth Position: Developing Air Capture Technologies 84	  
References 89	  
Appendix 1: Detailed Reconstructions 99 




This book is a slightly modified and updated translation of a study 
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) on Ethical Aspects of Climate Engineering. Par-
allel to this ethical assessment, further scoping reports on natural 
and social science as well as legal aspects of CE were compiled. 
The highly focused reports were eventually merged into a single 
interdisciplinary assessment, which is also available in English (cf. 
Rickels 2011). We have profited enormously from discussions with 
experts in charge of the other scoping reports and are indebted to 
the BMBF for providing the opportunity to carry out this study. 
The BMBF report has been finalised in spring 2011, and it is 
roughly the state of the CE debate at that point in time which is an-
alysed in this book. This holds in particular for the commented bib-
liography, compiled by Sebastian Cacean, but applies to the argu-
ments as well. The CE controversy, though, is advancing rapidly; 
ISI web of knowledge counts 44 new articles on “geoengineering” 
in 2011 alone. We thus conceive our assessment as a first, prelimi-
nary argumentative analysis only, which calls for more detailed in-
vestigations and continuous updates as the debate goes on. 
Last but not least, we would like to thank Heidemarie Knierim 
from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology for providing an excellent 
translation of the original German version. 
 
Gregor Betz, Sebastian Cacean 







The term “climate engineering” (CE) refers to large-scale technical 
interventions in the climate system with the objective of offsetting 
anthropogenic climate change. One distinguishes roughly between 
solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR) technologies. The main questions in dispute are whether CE 
technologies should (a) be researched into and (b) be deployed 
where appropriate. (1.1) 
This study investigates the ethical aspects of deploying and re-
searching into climate engineering. An ethical analysis assesses the 
moral reasons in favour of or against taking certain action or poli-
cies. Moral reasoning appraises actions or policies from an unbi-
ased point of view which takes the interests of all persons involved 
equally into account. Moral arguments differ fundamentally from 
economic or legal ones. (1.2) 
In this study, the moral reasons in favour of and against R&D 
into and deployment of CE methods are analysed by means of ar-
gument maps. These argument maps give a transparent overview of 
the CE controversy. Besides structuring the extremely complex de-
bate, they help, moreover, to determine and evaluate the positions 
held by proponents. (1.3) 
Argument maps consist of arguments (filled-in boxes) and the-
ses (framed boxes) which may support and attack each other (green 
and red arrows, respectively). (1.4) 
 
2 The Macrostructure of the Overall Debate 
The analysis of the CE controversy carried out hereunder uses 
placeholders. Instead of referring to specific CE methods, the re-
constructed arguments speak generically of the CE technology “T” 
– which, later, must be specified when evaluating the argumenta-
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tion. The central thesis of the controversy holds that R&D into the 
CE technology T ought to be carried out immediately (T1). This 
R&D obligation is contradicted by the R&D prohibition thesis T6. 
The central justification of research obligation T1 relies on three 
further theses:   
[T2 READINESS FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE] The CE tech-
nology T should be ready for deployment at a future point in 
time.  
[T3 SIDE-EFFECTS OF R&D NEGLIGIBLE] The side-effects of 
R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R are negli-
gible as compared to T being [probably] ready for deploy-
ment in time. 
[T4 NO ALTERNATIVES TO R&D (READINESS)] There are no 
more appropriate alternatives to immediate R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R which bring about that T is 
probably ready in time.  
Each of these theses ignites a more or less extensive sub-contro-
versy. In these sub-controversies, the contentious thesis that miti-
gation policies have priority over CE methods is of decisive im-
portance (T14). Moreover, the R&D prohibition thesis is being jus-
tified through an alternative argumentation that does not require the 
controversial thesis T2. Finally, the CE controversy also contains 
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Argument Map A (see also Chapter 2): This map visualises the overall 
structure of the reconstructed CE controversy. Besides central theses 
(framed boxes), it mainly displays argument clusters, which group indi-
vidual arguments. The argument clusters represent sub-debates of the 
controversy and exhibit a more or less complex internal argumentative 
structure. Argument clusters are numbered corresponding to section 
numbers in this book. Green and red arrows indicate argumentative 
impacts (supportive or critical) of the reasoning set forth in the corre-
sponding sub-controversies. 
 
3 The Detailed Structure of the Sub-debates 
The central justification of R&D represents a consequentialist ar-
gument. R&D into CE technologies is claimed to be a suitable 
means for reaching the goal that CE methods be ready for deploy-
ment in the future. This argument rests essentially on theses T2 – 
T4. (3.1) 
Thesis T3, which holds that the side-effects of R&D into CE are 
negligible, is challenged in the controversy by pointing out possi-
ble or probable harmful side-effects such as, in particular, the im-
pact on mitigation policies (moral-hazard objection), the inevitable 
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deployment of the technologies researched into, the commercial 
control of CE methods, risky field tests, and the risk of unilateral 
use. (3.2) 
The most extensive sub-controversy is based on thesis T2. Three 
different arguments justify why readiness for deployment of CE is 
desirable: At some future point in time, the deployment of CE 
methods could be the lesser of two evils, and we should prepare for 
that case (lesser-evil argumentation); without using CE methods, 
ambitious climate policy targets cannot be achieved anymore (two-
degree target/350 ppm argumentation); CE methods are more effi-
cient and can be implemented more easily than extensive mitiga-
tion policies (efficiency and feasibility considerations). These ar-
guments in favour of T2 are countered by numerous objections to 
T2. To start with, critical arguments based on the ethics of risk 
stress that the deployment of CE is accompanied by massive, irre-
ducible hazards. The prominent termination problem belongs to 
this category of objections, too. The arguments from justice and 
fairness point out the uneven regional consequences of CE de-
ployment. Geopolitical concerns arise because of the dual use 
problem and the fear that a “global thermostat” could induce new 
conflicts. Finally, several fundamental objections are raised in the 
controversy: They either rest on a general critique of technology 
and civilization or consist in religious, existentialist, or environ-
mental-ethics considerations. (3.3) 
Although alternative research justifications consider R&D into 
CE methods as being a suitable means for a given end, they differ 
from the central justification by specifying an altogether different 
purpose of research. According to these alternative arguments, re-
search does not aim at making CE methods ready for deployment. 
Rather, research should help, for example, to avoid hasty CE de-
ployment by pointing out the real risks and hazards involved. (3.4) 
Further arguments of the CE controversy are related to the lack of 
alternatives to CE R&D (T4), provide direct justifications of the 
R&D prohibition, broach the issue of national bans, and give rea-
sons for the priority of mitigation measures over CE methods. (3.5) 
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4. Central Issues, Principles, and Problems  
Weighting of side-effects represents a common issue that occurs 
throughout the CE controversy. The proponents of the controversy 
do not explicitly address (e.g. tackle through further arguments) the 
question as to how a series of side-effects, which are partly certain, 
partly probable, and partly possible, are to be evaluated and 
weighted against each other. Depending on which weighting is 
made by the proponents, they will endorse or not endorse the cor-
responding arguments and objections. (4.1) 
The CE controversy takes place against the background of mas-
sive uncertainties. Not only are the side-effects of R&D and de-
ployment poorly understood, but, what’s more, we can’t even reli-
ably predict the effectiveness of CE methods. That’s why more or 
less all arguments in the debate concern – in one or another way – 
the ethics of risk. A central question that arises in this context is 
how rational decisions can be made at all in spite of massive igno-
rance. The arguments where that decision-theoretic problem arises 
are reconstructed, in this study, such that they use variants of the 
precautionary principle. (4.2) 
The priority of mitigation policies (T14) is taken for granted by 
various arguments, in particular by the moral-hazard objections and 
the alternative justifications of CE research. Conversely, though, 
some arguments contradict more or less explicitly the thesis that 
mitigation policies take, in general, priority. This holds especially 
for the efficiency and feasibility argumentation, which considers 
CE methods a favourable substitute for mitigation policies. Most of 
the arguments of the CE controversy, however, are compatible with 
the priority of mitigation policies. (4.3) 
Within the CE controversy, moral and extra-moral considera-
tions seem to be deeply interwoven. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the moral arguments also make use of descriptive premisses 
such as forecasts of an action’s consequences. (4.4) 
One may broadly distinguish two types of arguments in the CE 
controversy: Those which make controversial ideological assump-
tions, and those which do not rely on strong normative premisses 
but which involve, at most, contentious descriptive assumptions or 
basically shared principles whose concrete application is contro-
versial. The first category comprises, in particular, the religious, 
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existentialist, and environmental-ethics arguments, the efficiency 
and feasibility consideration, the arguments that rely on a critique 
of technology and civilization, the research neutrality reasoning, 
the arguments from fairness, and some arguments belonging to the 
sub-controversy about R&D side-effects. (4.5) 
 
5 Coherent Positions and their Logico-argumentative Implica-
tions 
Analysing a complex controversy as an argument map allows to 
check proponent positions (actually or possibly held) for coher-
ence. A core position, which consists in accepting or rejecting cer-
tain arguments and theses, has logico-argumentative implications 
that go beyond the core position itself because (i) one is bound to 
accept the logical consequences of the sentences one accepts and 
(ii) one must reject the direct objections to one’s core position. 
Proponents endorsing R&D into some CE method, thus, are 
obliged to reject the relevant objections to R&D into CE; propo-
nents rejecting CE R&D have to specify on which points they disa-
gree with the diverse research justifications. It is these very consid-
erations that are relevant when drafting coherent political positions. 
For illustrative purposes, the following positions can be checked 
for coherence: Endorsement of SRM research for reasons of easi-
ness and efficiency; endorsement of R&D into ocean fertilization 
to detect the associated risks; rejection of SRM R&D on account of 
basic considerations from democratic theory and fairness; en-
dorsement of CDR development for the purpose of achieving ambi-




1.1 Geoengineering – Climate Engineering 
The term “climate engineering” (CE) refers to large-scale technical 
interventions in the climate system with the objective of offsetting 
anthropogenic climate change. One distinguishes roughly between 
solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR) technologies. The main questions in dispute are whether CE 
technologies should (a) be researched into and (b) be deployed 
where appropriate.  
Man is changing the climate. Although both the exact extent and 
the details of anthropogenic climate change are still uncertain, the 
fact that we massively affect the climate system, in particular by 
increasing the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases, is 
not seriously argued anymore (IPCC WGI 2007). Recent observa-
tions even indicate that the IPCC climate projections rather under- 
than overestimate anthropogenic climate change (WBGU 2006; 
WBGU 2009; Allison et al. 2009). The ethical issues resulting 
from these long-term impacts of human action have long since 
been acknowledged (cf. Gardiner 2004, 2010a) and have triggered 
philosophical controversies concerning our responsibility towards 
future generations (Birnbacher 1995), the acceptability of discount-
ing future damage and benefits (Birnbacher 2001; Ott 2004), the 
appropriate evaluation of the impacts of climate change (Broome 
2004, 2006), the handling of risks and uncertainties (Gottschalk-
Mazouz et al. 2003), and the fair distribution of emission rights 
(Shue 2008; Ott et al. 2008). These ethical investigations are main-
ly concerned with the design of and our moral obligation to imple-
ment mitigation and adaptation policies. Recent developments of 
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the climate policy debate are, however, posing new challenges to 
climate ethics.  
In his 2006 article Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur 
Injection: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, atmos-
pheric chemist and Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen suggests compen-
sating anthropogenic climate change by targeted large-scale inter-
ventions in the climate system (Crutzen 2006). Indeed, such so-
called geoengineering measures had occasionally been discussed 
before Crutzen’s article was published (Schneider 1996; Keith 
2000, 2001a); and, not least against the background of military 
considerations, technical interventions for deliberate weather modi-
fication had been thought about time and again in the course of the 
20th century (Fleming 2010). Crutzen’s deliberate plea for research 
into measures such as these, however, has made the controversy a 
permanent issue in scientific journals and the public media. So as 
to differentiate between the concepts underlying the latest pro-
posals that are aimed at offsetting anthropogenic global warming 
and previous proposals for large-scale restructuring of the envi-
ronment, we will refer below to “climate engineering” instead of 
using the term “geoengineering”. Basically, there are two kinds of 
climate engineering measures (CE measures): Those intervening in 
the global carbon cycle to reduce the concentration of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (Carbon Dioxide Removal, CDR) and those inter-
vening directly in the radiation balance of the Earth, for example to 
increase the share of the reflected incident solar radiation (Solar 
Radiation Management, SRM). In September 2009, the British 
Royal Society published a report that introduces and examines the 
different proposals (Royal Society 2009). A second report by the 
Royal Society, published in 2011, focuses on governance schemes 
for CE research (Royal Society 2011). Another survey, although 
limited to policies influencing the radiation balance and to drafting 
a tentative research agenda, is given by Blackstock et al. (2009).  
Two central questions are raised by the proposal to offset an-
thropogenic climate change by CE measures: 
[Deployment] Should CE measures be deployed? (Under 
which conditions would deployment be appropriate, and how 
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is one supposed to differentiate between the various CE tech-
nologies?)  
[R&D] Should CE measures be researched into? (What 
would be the time frame for such research? What should be 
the dedicated purpose of research into the relevant technolo-
gies? How do we set research priorities?)  
These two issues represent the central focus and starting point of 
the reconstruction of the CE controversy put forward in this study. 
1.2 An Introductory Note on Ethics 
This study investigates the ethical aspects of deploying and re-
searching into climate engineering. An ethical analysis assesses the 
moral reasons in favour of or against taking certain action or poli-
cies. Moral reasoning appraises actions or policies from an unbi-
ased point of view which takes the interests of all persons involved 
equally into account. Moral arguments differ fundamentally from 
economic or legal ones.  
This study investigates the ethical aspects of deploying and re-
searching into climate engineering. What, though, is understood by 
“ethical aspects”? And which form can ethical expertise assume at 
all? 
“Ethics” is understood as the systematic theory of moral evalua-
tion and reasoning. It is thus a scientific discipline focusing on 
morals as the subject of investigation. But then, what does “moral”, 
or “morals”, mean? The adjective “moral” describes a certain man-
ner of evaluating, arguing, and acting. While ethical considerations 
are mainly academic, all of us – more or less - reason and act mor-
ally. To be more precise, an action is evaluated as morally right or 
wrong if evaluation is made from an unbiased point of view, i.e. 
from a viewpoint considering, in particular, all relevant interests of 
all persons that may be involved. Moral evaluations are character-
ised by their detachedness. Obviously, this is a rather general (or 
philosophically spoken “purely formal”) explication of the concept 
of morality: Such an abstract explication is, for instance, not capa-
ble of deciding matters of moral disagreement and does in no way 
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provide definite moral evaluations of a specific situation or action. 
Moral disagreement is resolved by giving and taking concrete ar-
guments that are related to the corresponding particular case – and 
not by recourse to abstract definitions of what is morally right or 
wrong.  
Moral reasoning and evaluation clearly differ from other man-
ners of analysing and evaluating political measures. Legal evalua-
tion, for example, assesses whether, in accordance with applicable 
laws, bans may have to be imposed on a certain technology. Ap-
parently, however, conformity with applicable law does not imply 
that the relevant action is also permissible from an unbiased point 
of view that takes into account the interests of all persons involved. 
Also, geopolitical and economic analyses must be distinguished 
from moral evaluations. If, as a political-science analysis may re-
veal, some policy is – allegedly – in the national interest of a coun-
try, it is thereby shown to be beneficial from a narrow and biased 
perspective (which acknowledges the country’s interests) only, but 
not yet from an unbiased moral point of view. In the same way, 
economic analyses, assessing the effects of political measures on 
economic factors, do not reveal whether some specific measure 
considers all relevant interests adequately. It is necessary to distin-
guish between moral, on the one hand, and legal or social-science 
analyses and reasoning on the other hand. Nevertheless, as will be 
shown below, the results of the two latter may pass on, as assump-
tions, into moral arguments.  
This said, we may now turn to the function and nature of ethical 
expertise. First of all, ethical expertise is a type of scientific policy 
advice. Consequently, it is based on and must fulfil the same stand-
ards as natural science, legal or economic policy advice. In demo-
cratic societies, these standards include, in particular, the ideal of 
value-freedom. Accordingly, it is not the scientific expert but the 
democratically legitimised decision-maker who must determine 
which targets are to be pursued and realised through policy 
measures. Scientific policy advice must hence be free from (non-
epistemic) normative assumptions. Now, ethical expertise deals in-
evitably with normative (namely moral) considerations, which, 
however, it must not assume to be correct according to the ideal of 
value-freedom. Therefore, ethical expertise can only set forth con-
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ditional normative recommendations (Grunwald 2008:317 et seq.). 
In other words, ethical advice makes explicit the basic moral as-
sumptions without asserting them, e.g.: If the basic normative as-
sumptions A are shared and the forecast F is accepted, then the ob-
jection O is defeated and the policy measure P should be taken; if, 
in contrast, the basic normative assumptions A’ are shared and the 
prediction F’ is accepted, then the objection O’ is defeated and the 
policy measure P’ should be taken. Ethical expertise strives to 
make as transparent as possible the manifold relations between our 
normative beliefs against the background of a given, more or less 
certain factual knowledge. It thus seeks to enable decision-makers 
and the public alike to grasp the relevant moral aspects of an up-
coming decision and to found their choices on a coherent basis of 
normative beliefs. 
1.3 Methods Applied 
In this study, the moral reasons in favour of and against R&D into 
and deployment of CE methods are analysed by means of argument 
maps. These argument maps give a transparent overview of the CE 
controversy. Besides structuring the extremely complex debate, 
they help, moreover, to determine and evaluate the positions held 
by proponents.  
So as to clarify the manifold moral aspects and assumptions per-
taining to CE, along with their interrelations, this study has applied 
the method of argument mapping (Betz 2010). Notably, the results 
presented below have been obtained from the following steps:  
1. Compilation of a commented bibliography of texts addressing 
ethical aspects of CE.  
2. Mapping of the logico-dialectical landscape of the CE con-
troversy in the form of argument maps, based on the respec-
tive text sources.  
3. Presentation of intermediate results on the occasion of a sym-
posium on ethical aspects of CE (Ethische Aspekte des CE) 
held in Greifswald, Germany (September 2010) and during a 
separate workshop (November 2010) within a scoping project 
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of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research; 
revision of argument maps in the light of the feedback re-
ceived.   
Without doubt, step 2 is the most comprehensive one, and the cor-
responding approach requires detailed explanation.  
Firstly, complex argumentation can be analysed and mapped at 
different levels of detail. In a relatively coarse-grained analysis, the 
respective arguments and theses are identified, the basic ideas of 
the arguments are outlined in a few sentences, and the assumed re-
lations between the theses and arguments (support or attack) are 
sketched. The analysis becomes, in contrast, far more exact if the 
individual arguments are reconstructed as premiss-conclusion 
structures. Such, and only such, reconstruction can make the hid-
den assumptions explicit and reveal how the arguments are actually 
related to each other. This study sketches the entire moral contro-
versy about CE, which is documented in the commented bibliog-
raphy. By contrast, only a few selected arguments are reconstructed 
in detail. The argument maps presented hereunder must hence be 
regarded as preliminary results that can be revised more or less ex-
tensively through further detailed analyses.  
Secondly, the reconstruction of the CE controversy makes use of 
placeholders. As a matter of fact, there are more than one dozen 
different CE technologies that vary substantially regarding, for ex-
ample, their respective operating cost or the extent of potential 
side-effects. Hence, the arguments in favour of and against one CE 
measure may differ radically from the arguments that pertain to 
another CE measure. This would suggest to reconstruct separate 
argument maps for each individual CE technology. Since such ar-
gument maps would share some albeit not all arguments, the al-
ready complex reconstruction below would probably have become 
impenetrable. Now, the placeholder method offers a solution. In-
stead of referring to a specific CE technology, e.g. ocean fertiliza-
tion, the reconstructed arguments remain abstract and speak of CE 
technology T. As a consequence, full-fledged arguments that, for 
example, can be checked for soundness (i.e. whose premisses and 
conclusions may be true or false) are not obtained unless all occur-
rences of placeholder “T” are substituted by a concrete technology 
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such as ocean fertilization or air capture. Arguments that may be-
come very convincing through one such substitution may well be-
come implausible through another. And yet, without any substitu-
tion whatsoever, the argument maps can reveal how the different 
types of considerations are related to each other argumentatively. 
Now, the placeholder method has not only been used for taking the 
different CE technologies (placeholder “T”) into account but also 
for dealing with the variety of R&D strategies and targets. In fact, 
there are quite different ways of conducting research into a tech-
nology: Research may, for example, prepare future deployment of 
a technology – in which case we would also speak of “technology 
development”. In contrast, technologies can also be researched into 
by just taking a closer look at risks and side-effects. The R&D 
mode is abbreviated in the arguments and theses through place-
holder “R”. This second placeholder, too, requires substitution (e.g. 
“technology development”, “risk assessment”, etc.) before the ar-
guments can be evaluated for soundness and theses can be checked 
for plausibility and truth.  
Thirdly, argument reconstructions are always interpretations. 
This being definitely true for coarse-grained analysis, it is also fact 
that, when compiling a detailed argument reconstruction, there is 
always room for interpretation that one can fill in one way or an-
other. Hence, there is no such thing as the one and only correct re-
construction of a controversy. This, in turn, does not imply that ar-
gument reconstructions are completely arbitrary. In particular, the 
analysis carried out within this study is based on the principle of 
charity, i.e. it attempts to render the arguments as strong and con-
vincing as possible. This is to ensure that reasons are not being 
prematurely rejected merely due to a biased interpretation. In addi-
tion, any whatsoever room for interpretation presents a much 
smaller impediment to controversy assessment (as compared to re-
construction) than may first be assumed. For sure, it is a matter of 
interpretation how accurately a proponent’s consideration is repre-
sented. Whether, however, given the reconstructed debate, a posi-
tion is still coherent at all remains largely unaffected by issues of 
interpretation and can be determined objectively relative to the ar-
guments identified.  
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Fourthly, and finally, the reconstruction itself does not judge or 
value and can never be concluding or complete: It does neither de-
cide on who is right nor on who has the final say in a debate. 
On the one hand, the reconstruction is not judging: Firstly and 
directly, the reconstruction itself entails only if-then claims: If cer-
tain statements are true, then certain other statements that occur in 
the debate must also be true. The argument map does not reveal 
which statements are true; it is, thus, neutral and open to different 
evaluations (depending on which statements one considers to be 
true, false or uncertain). In other words, the argument map disclos-
es the questions to be answered in order to adopt a position in the 
debate and merely points out the consequences of different answers 
to these questions.  
Because of this, a thesis that is supported by many arguments is 
not necessarily true. And, by the same token, a thesis that is at-
tacked by many arguments is by no means bound to be false. This 
applies equally to arguments: An attack on an argument does not 
imply that the very argument is definitely refuted. It may be, for 
example, that the attacking argument itself implies – from an eval-
uative perspective – absurd premisses that can easily be criticised 
by adding further arguments.   
Argument maps can be used to determine positions proponents 
may adopt and to check these positions for coherence (cf. Chapter 
5). Moreover, argument maps can be important tools for coping 
with conflicting positions. As a matter of fact, dissent can have two 
causes: (i) The proponents have overlooked arguments put forward 
by their respective opponent. (ii) Some arguments and theses are 
evaluated differently. Ad (i): Should it be found that dissent arises, 
among other things, from not yet having considered certain argu-
ments, the argument maps should be completed by the correspond-
ing considerations and the positions held by the opponents should 
be re-evaluated thereupon. At best, dissent is dissolved right after 
that. Ad (ii): If there is dissent in spite of agreement on the set of 
relevant arguments, one may proceed as follows. Using the maps, 
one firstly identifies the theses and arguments mutually agreed on 
by the opponents. Based on this common ground, one then tries to 
determine or develop consensual policies. In other words: The ar-
gument maps can be used for developing robust proposals for ac-
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tion, i.e. proposals that are compatible with many different posi-
tions and sets of basic moral assumptions.  
1.4 How to Read Argument Maps  
Argument maps consist of arguments (filled-in boxes) and theses 
(framed boxes) which may support and attack each other (green 
and red arrows, respectively).  
Arguments are (i) roughly sketched in a few sentences (coarse-
grained analysis) or are (ii) reconstructed as deductively valid 
premiss-conclusion structures (detailed analysis). The dialectical 
relations (attack, support) between arguments are either sketched 
(coarse-grained analysis) or are determined as follows (detailed 
analysis): An argument supports another one if the supporting ar-
gument’s conclusion figures as premiss in the supported one. And 
an argument attacks another one if the attacking argument’s con-
clusion negates a premiss of the attacked one.  
An argument map visualises these relations. It contains two 
types of elements: Simple sentences (e.g. central theses) are visual-
ised as framed white boxes while arguments (containing sentences 
as premisses and conclusions) are shown as filled-in boxes. To en-
sure clear arrangement, the maps do not show all the sentences oc-
curring in the arguments as sentences but only visualise the sen-
tences that are of special relevance in the debate (e.g. are referred 
to in multiple arguments).  
If a sentence that has been visualised in the argument map at the 
same time occurs in an argument as premiss, this is indicated by a 
green arrow pointing from the sentence towards the argument. If 
the negation of such a sentence occurs as premiss in an argument, 
this is visualised by a red arrow. In the same way, the relations be-
tween arguments are represented: If an argument supports another 
argument, this is shown by a green arrow; a red arrow indicates 
that one argument attacks another.  
The outlined and reconstructed arguments and theses are con-
secutively numbered. In the running text, “T1”, “T2”, etc. refer to 
the respective theses while “A1”, “A2”, etc. point to the respective 
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arguments. Brief designations (e.g. “T1 READINESS FOR DEPLOY-
MENT DESIRABLE”) of the arguments or theses may be given in ad-
dition to facilitate readability. The appendix lists all argument ab-
breviations and titles and compiles all argument sketches and re-
constructions. Individual premisses and conclusions, numbered al-
so, are referred to as “(n)”, where n is the corresponding sentence 
number if the sentence is found in the argument listed last. “(m.n)” 
with n being the sentence number and m the number of the argu-
ment is used otherwise; “(23.4)” hence refers to the sentence num-
bered 4 of argument A23.  
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2 The Macrostructure of the Overall Debate  
The analysis of the CE controversy carried out hereunder uses 
placeholders. Instead of referring to specific CE methods, the re-
constructed arguments speak generically of the CE technology “T” 
– which, later, must be specified when evaluating the argumenta-
tion. The central thesis of the controversy holds that R&D into the 
CE technology T ought to be carried out immediately (T1). This 
R&D obligation is contradicted by the R&D prohibition thesis T6. 
The central justification of research obligation T1 relies on three 
further theses:   
[T2 READINESS FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE] The CE technology 
T should be ready for deployment at a future point in time.  
[T3 SIDE-EFFECTS OF R&D NEGLIGIBLE] The side-effects of R&D 
into the CE technology T under the aspect R are negligible as com-
pared to T being [probably] ready for deployment in time. 
[T4 NO ALTERNATIVES TO R&D (READINESS)] There are no more 
appropriate alternatives to immediate R&D into the CE technology 
T under the aspect R which bring about that T is probably ready in 
time.  
Each of these theses ignites a more or less extensive sub-contro-
versy. In these sub-controversies, the contentious thesis that miti-
gation policies have priority over CE methods is of decisive im-
portance (T14). Moreover, the R&D prohibition thesis is being jus-
tified through an alternative argumentation that does not require the 
controversial thesis T2. Finally, the CE controversy also contains 
direct justifications of the R&D prohibition.  
As already indicated in the introduction, the term “climate engi-
neering“ subsumes various different technologies which all aim at 
large-scale interventions in the climate system, but which, at the 
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same time, substantially differ from one another regarding risks, 
effectiveness, side-effects, and costs of deployment. Since these 
aspects are also relevant to the moral assessment of the correspond-
ing technologies (i.e. of their R&D and deployment), the following 
problem arises for the argumentative analysis: To do justice to the 
different CE technologies, the question of whether, for instance, 
ocean fertilization should be further researched into would have to 
be discussed separately and independently from the question of 
whether, let’s say, cloud-albedo enhancement should be researched 
into as well. This applies, mutatis mutandis, to the remaining tech-
nologies as well. Accordingly, not only one but a rough dozen CE 
controversies, each dealing with a different technology, would 
have to be differentiated and reconstructed.  Since the results of 
such an analysis would be extremely comprehensive and, in addi-
tion, redundant in many respects, this study uses a placeholder 
method (cf. Section 1.3).  
The central theses of the CE controversy, which directly address 
the key questions of the debate (see Section 1.1), and their logico-
argumentative interrelations can be outlined as follows. The thesis  
• [T1 R&D OBLIGATION] R&D into the CE technology T under 
the aspect R ought to be carried out immediately.  
answers the central R&D question positively. It is contradicted by 
the thesis  
• [T6 R&D PROHIBITION] R&D into the CE technology T un-
der the aspect R must not be carried out.  
Three further theses fuel the central justification of the R&D obli-
gation (T1), as Section 3.1 explains in more detail.  
• [T2 READINESS FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE] The CE tech-
nology T should be ready for deployment at a future point in 
time.  
• [T3 SIDE-EFFECTS OF R&D NEGLIGIBLE] The side-effects of 
R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R are negli-
gible as compared to T being [probably] ready for deploy-
ment in time.  
• [T4 NO ALTERNATIVES TO R&D (READINESS)] There are no 
more appropriate alternatives to immediate R&D into the CE 
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technology T under the aspect R which bring about that T is 
probably ready in time.  
Taken together, the three theses T2-T4 constitute a sufficient rea-
son for R&D into the CE technology T. Reversely though, each of 
these theses represents a necessary condition for R&D obligation, 
as pointed out in Section 3.1: Should one of these theses be false, it 
would be wrong to carry out R&D into technology T, at least as 
regards achieving readiness for deployment.  
Theses T2-T4 are the starting points of more or less comprehen-
sive sub-debates of the CE controversy. Based on these theses, the 
overall debate can thus be clearly structured into sub-controversies.  
The expected R&D side-effects and their assessment are the 
subject of the sub-debate that is associated with T3. Within that 
part of the debate, the side-effects of R&D are weighted and com-
pared to the target of achieving readiness of deployment (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2).  
Thesis T2, according to which readiness for deployment at a fu-
ture point in time is desirable, triggers the most comprehensive 
sub-debate of the CE controversy (see Section 3.3). It contains var-
ious pro and con arguments of different types. These arguments are 
either directly related to thesis T2 (i.e. support or attack it) or back 
up the assumption 
• [T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG] A future deployment of the 
CE technology T is in any case (morally) wrong.  
T9 is closely connected with T2: If T9 were true, then T2 would be 
false – for why should technologies whose deployment would be 
morally wrong be ready for deployment in the first place? The ar-
guments supporting thesis T9 thus indirectly attack T2.  
T4, too, appears to be contestable (cf. Section 3.5.1). According 
to the findings of the authors, though, hardly any arguments have 
been put forward so far in order to settle the question whether there 
are no alternatives to immediate R&D, should the appropriate CE 
technologies be ready for deployment in time. The thesis T4 is only 
challenged by few arguments.  
Irrespective of the issue of the future readiness for deployment, 
several further reasons are given in favour of the R&D obligation 
T1 (cf. Section 3.4). These alternative justifications do not depend 
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on the highly contentious thesis T2 and, thus, circumnavigate the 
most comprehensive sub-controversy of the overall debate. How-
ever, the alternative justifications of T1, too, make use of premisses 
that, in line with T3 and T4, hold that R&D side-effects are negli-
gible and that there are no alternatives to immediate R&D. T3 and 
T4 thus turn out to be the actual touchstones of any position what-
soever which embraces R&D into CE technologies.  
The critique of R&D into CE technologies is not limited to at-
tacking theses T2-T4. Independent of the objections to T2-T4, T6, 
which proscribes R&D, is supported by a number of ethical argu-
ments that have already been discussed in some detail in the cur-
rent debate (see Section 3.5.2).  
Another important thesis which, although conceded by most of 
the proponents, mainly supports the arguments of the critics, as-
serts that mitigation policies, which try to prevent anthropogenic 
climate change through emission reduction, have priority over CE 
measures.  
• [T14 MITIGATION FIRST] Mitigation, as a climate policy op-
tion, is preferable to CE deployment.  
Thesis T14 represents the starting point of various arguments in the 
CE controversy (cf. Section 4.3) and can itself be justified in dif-
ferent ways (see Section 3.5.4).  
In line with the above, the macrostructure of the entire recon-



































T9 CE Deployment Wrong
 
Argument Map A: This map visualises the overall structure of the re-
constructed CE controversy. Besides central theses (framed boxes), it 
mainly displays argument clusters, which group individual arguments. 
The argument clusters represent sub-debates of the controversy and ex-
hibit a more or less complex internal argumentative structure. Argu-
ment clusters are numbered corresponding to section numbers in this 
book. Green and red arrows indicate argumentative impacts (supportive 




3 The Detailed Structure of the Sub-debates  
3.1 The Central Justification of R&D  
The central justification of R&D represents a consequentialist ar-
gument. R&D into CE technologies is claimed to be a suitable 
means for reaching the goal that CE methods be ready for deploy-
ment in the future. This argument rests essentially on theses T2 – 
T4. 
The argument map below shows the dialectical structure of the 
































Argument Map B 
The central argument in favour of R&D into CE technology T jus-
tifies thesis T1 by saying that R&D is required to have CE technol-
ogies ready for deployment in the future. Accordingly, this justifi-
cation infers appropriate means from a desired end and can be re-
constructed as a so-called consequentialist argument, A1 MAKING 
CE TECHNOLOGIES READY,  
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1) The CE technology T should be ready for deployment at a fu-
ture point in time. [T2] 
2) Immediate R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R 
[probably] brings about that T is ready in time.  
3) There are no more appropriate alternatives to immediate 
R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R which 
bring about that T is ready in time while at the same time be-
ing more appropriate than immediate R&D into the CE tech-
nology. [T4] 
4) The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R are negligible as compared to T being [probably] 
ready for deployment in time. [T3] 
5) R&D into a technology ought to be carried out immediately if 
the following conditions are met: 1. The technology should 
be ready for deployment at a future point in time; 2. Immedi-
ate R&D [probably] brings about that the technology will be 
ready for deployment; 3. There are no alternatives which 
bring about that the technology is ready in time while at the 
same time being more appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. 
The side-effects of R&D are negligible as compared to the 
technology being ready for deployment.  
6) THUS (from 1-5): R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R ought to be carried out.  
Besides assuming theses T2-T5, the central argument relies on the 
thesis that research is in fact effective (i.e. it is at least likely to 
bring about that the respective technology becomes ready for de-
ployment, premiss 1.2), as well as on a means-end principle in 
premiss (1.5) which is a special case of a more general principle of 
instrumental rationality (T5).  
The prohibition of R&D (T6) contradicts the obligation to carry out 
research (T1), as argument A3 makes explicit. Negating one of the 
three theses T2-T4, which are assumed in R&D justification A1, 
yields immediately a justification of the R&D prohibition (cf. ar-
guments A4-A6). The decisive general premiss that these argu-
ments are based on establishes the necessary normative conditions 
of R&D into a technology,  
 25 
• [T7 PRECONDITIONS OF PERMISSIBLE R&D] R&D into a 
technology under the aspect R may be carried out only if each 
of the following conditions is met:  
1. There is a chance of achieving readiness for deployment.  
2. The direct costs of R&D are reasonable.  
3. The readiness for deployment of the technology outweighs, 
considering the probability that such readiness be actually 
achieved, the expected certain, probable, and possible side-
effects of R&D.  
4. It is desirable to have the technology ready for deployment.  
These preconditions, once again, can be derived from a more gen-
eral principle (argument A7) if one assumes that the purpose of 
R&D consists in achieving readiness for deployment (premiss 7.3). 
Theses T2-T4 thus constitute jointly sufficient and individually 
necessary conditions for the R&D obligation (T1). Hence, they rep-
resent decisive statements and focal points of the debate. It is there-
fore not surprising that these theses are suited for structuring the 
overall debate as explained in Section 2.  
The argument map introduced under Section 3.1 reconstructs the 
core of the CE controversy. That core, however, remains by and 
large implicit in the current debate. It seems that most participants 
in the debate tacitly conceive R&D to be justified along the lines of 
A1 MAKING CE TECHNOLOGIES READY. But this is only revealed 
through further considerations (supporting arguments and objec-
tions) made by the proponents which can be related to the premiss-
es of A1. So, since the central argument of the debate is hardly ever 
made explicit, Section 3.1, unlike the following sections, cannot be 
backed by references. 
3.2 Side-effects of R&D 
Thesis T3, which holds that the side-effects of R&D into CE are 
negligible, is challenged in the controversy by pointing out possi-
ble or probable harmful side-effects such as, in particular, the im-
pact on mitigation policies (moral-hazard objection), the inevitable 
deployment of the technologies researched into, the commercial 
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control of CE methods, risky field tests, and the risk of unilateral 
use. 
The sub-debate about the negligibility of R&D side-effects can be 






























Argument Map C 
Here, thesis T3 is challenged by the central argument 
A8 OVERWHELMING NEGATIVE SIDE-EFFECTS which (i) points out 
the diverse side-effects of R&D into CE, (ii) assesses them as be-
ing harmful, and (iii) weighs them against the intended R&D ob-
jective (achievement of readiness for deployment). The decisive 
premiss within argument A8 is  
8) The possible and probable negative side-effects SE1-SE7 
clearly outweigh the sum of all [certain, probable, and possi-
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ble] useful side-effects and the [probable] intended effect that 
technology T is ready for deployment.  
Arguments A9 to A15 in argument map C identify the alleged, 
harmful side-effects of R&D.  
One of the most frequently mentioned and, thus, most prominent 
objections to CE argues that the very R&D into such technologies 
could cause a substantial reduction of mitigation efforts (cf. e.g. 
Keith 2000:276; Royal Society 2009; Gardiner 2010b:292; Ja-
mieson 1996:333 et seq.; Robock 2008a,b; ETC 2009:34). Carry-
ing out R&D into CE, the argument warns, might suggest that there 
is a technical solution to the climate problem, and this in turn could 
prevent public and private stakeholders from implementing more 
or less painful mitigation measures. This argument, A9, which is 
sometimes also referred to as “moral-hazard objection”, identifies a 
potential side-effect of mere R&D into CE and, thus, supports ar-
gument A8. But why should there be a trade-off between mitiga-
tion on the one side and R&D into CE on the other one? Critics 
suggest different mechanisms which, should CE be researched into, 
could at least potentially affect mitigation policies in a negative 
way:  
• [A17 INTEREST GROUPS] With larger sums going into CE 
R&D, lobby groups that tend to be opposed to ambitious mit-
igation policies will be established and strengthened.  
• [A18 CE HYPE] R&D into CE could trigger an outright CE 
hype. And the discussion of CE alone could undermine the 
motivation for realising costly mitigation and adaptation poli-
cies. 
• [A19 UNDERMINING BETTER OPTIONS] The financial and 
cognitive resources that are used for R&D into CE are not 
available for preparing and implementing mitigation policies.  
Still, the argument of mitigation obstruction has also been criti-
cised. While the Royal Society (2009) and Corner & Pidgeon 
(2010) point out that the actual extent of the assumed trade-off is 
uncertain (A20), David Keith et al. (2010) accuse the argument of 
presuming false exclusiveness and say that R&D and mitigation 
may well coexist. Whether, however, these objections definitely 
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affect the argument of mitigation obstruction (A9) can only be de-
termined through a detailed reconstruction and, thus, has to be set-
tled in future research.  
The arguments below identify further assumed side-effects of 
R&D into CE:   
• [A10 UNSTOPPABLE DEVELOPMENT] Research into CE might 
create an internal dynamic which inevitably leads to deploy-
ment even if deployment is dispensable. Yet, one must be 
able to halt R&D into risk technologies at any moment. (Ja-
mieson 1996:333 et seq.) 
• [A11 COMMERCIAL CONTROL] CE technologies might ulti-
mately be controlled by big business that acts purely on the 
basis of commercial interest. This would lead to problems 
similar to those experienced in the pharmaceutical sector. 
(Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:29,34) 
• [A12 FIELD TESTS] R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R inevitably goes along with large-scale field tests 
which actually lead to deployment of T before T has been 
thoroughly probed. (Elliott 2010:11; Robock 2010) 
• [A13 TECHNO ESCALATION] R&D into CE may sanction 
technical interventions into nature on any scale whatsoever. 
(cf. Keith 2000) 
• [A14 POLITICAL ECONOMY] CE promotes the military-
industrial sectors and the business branches that are the most 
reactionary in terms of climate policy. (Ott 2010a,b,d) 
• [A15 UNILATERAL DEPLOYMENT] R&D into CE might lead 
to unilateral deployment with catastrophic impacts. (Goodell 
2010:195-7) 
While arguments A9 to A15, via A8, challenge the thesis of the 
negligibility of side-effects of R&D by listing potential negative 
side-effects, the positive side-effects of CE R&D counterbalance, 
in principle, such criticism. If the positive and negative side-effects 
were balanced, they could, in sum, turn out to be negligible indeed. 
Yet, proponents of the current debate, as analysed in this study, 
hardly advance positive side-effects of R&D at all. It is only Ott 
(Ott 2010a,b,d) who mentions a useful side-effect: 
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• [A16 INNOVATION ARGUMENT] R&D into new technologies 
such as CE triggers spin-offs and creates jobs.  
This argument, however, rests on fairly strong assumptions, as the 
detailed reconstruction reveals, A16,  
1) As a possible positive side-effect, R&D into the CE technol-
ogy under the aspect R might lead to the creation of spin-offs 
and jobs.  
2) The potential creation of spin-offs and jobs, together with the 
intended achievement of readiness for deployment, outweighs 
the possible and probable negative side-effects SE1-SE7.  
3) THUS (from 1,2): It is not true that: The possible and probable 
negative side-effects SE1-SE7 clearly outweigh the sum of all 
[certain, probable, and possible] useful side-effects and the 
[probable] intended consequence that technology T is ready 
for deployment.  
3.3 Readiness for Deployment 
The most extensive sub-controversy is based on thesis T2. Three 
different arguments justify why readiness for deployment of CE is 
desirable: At some future point in time, the deployment of CE 
methods could be the lesser of two evils, and we should prepare for 
that case (lesser-evil argumentation); without using CE methods, 
ambitious climate policy targets cannot be achieved anymore (two-
degree target/350 ppm argumentation); CE methods are more effi-
cient and can be implemented more easily than extensive mitiga-
tion policies (efficiency and feasibility considerations). These ar-
guments in favour of T2 are countered by numerous objections to 
T2. To start with, critical arguments based on the ethics of risk 
stress that the deployment of CE is accompanied by massive, irre-
ducible hazards. The prominent termination problem belongs to 
this category of objections, too. The arguments from justice and 
fairness point out the uneven regional consequences of CE de-
ployment. Geopolitical concerns arise because of the dual use 
problem and the fear that a “global thermostat” could induce new 
conflicts. Finally, several fundamental objections are raised in the 
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controversy: They either rest on a general critique of technology 
and civilization or consist in religious, existentialist, or environ-
mental-ethics considerations. 
The sub-controversy about the readiness for deployment is ignited 
by thesis T2 READINESS FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE. It is the 
most comprehensive sub-debate within the CE controversy. The 
mesostructure of this sub-debate is illustrated in the argument map 













































Argument Map D 
Thesis T2 is supported by three argument clusters. These pro ar-
guments are discussed in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The objections to T2 
either target T2 directly (cf. geopolitical considerations, Section 
3.3.7, and some of the justice-theory arguments, Section 3.3.5) or 
indirectly oppose it by supporting T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG 
(this holds for argument clusters 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3.3.9). 
According to T9, the deployment of CE is morally wrong anyhow, 
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and, thus, readiness for deployment is not desirable (A22). Consid-
erations from ethics of risk, moreover, give rise to an objection to 
the lesser-evil argumentation (via T11, A53). In addition, the feasi-
bility considerations, on the one hand, and objections based on a 
fundamental critique of civilization, on the other hand, make use of 
one and the same premiss:   
•  [T10 CE EASY] Implementation of the CE technology is 
comparatively easy.   
Hence, what in some arguments and for some proponents repre-
sents a reason in favour of readiness for deployment becomes a 
principal objection to deployment in other arguments and for other 
proponents. 
3.3.1 Lesser-evil Argumentation (Pro) 
The lesser-evil argument is certainly among the most important 
justifications of thesis T2, and, consequently, of the central R&D 
obligation in general. It already figures prominently in early arti-
cles by Stephen Schneider and Dale Jamieson, which include cau-
tious pleas in favour of R&D into CE (Schneider 1996, Jamieson 
1996). The mesostructure of the lesser-evil argumentation, together 























Argument Map E 
The central lesser-evil argument, A23, justifies thesis T2 by saying 
that there may be future situations (e.g. if climate sensitivity turns 
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out to be very high or if our mitigation efforts prove to be insuffi-
cient) where the (admittedly extremely risky) deployment of the 
CE technology T may be considered the lesser evil – since, without 
CE deployment, we would face uncompensated catastrophic cli-
mate change. The lesser-evil argument holds that, in view of such 
possible climate emergency, the CE technologies should, as a pre-
cautionary measure, at least be ready for deployment. A detailed 
reconstruction of this important argument reveals that, simple as it 
may seem, it builds on subtle decision-theoretic considerations, 
A23 LESSER-EVIL,   
1) At some future point in time t, we may end up in a situation 
where (a) the worst possible impacts of the deployment of the 
CE technology T are clearly less severe than the worst possi-
ble consequences of not deploying it; where (b) relevant 
probability forecasts are not at our disposal; and where (c) the 
worst possible consequences of not deploying CE would in 
fact be catastrophic. 
2) If relevant probability forecasts are unavailable and if the 
worst possible consequences of a decision are actually cata-
strophic, one should choose the option for action with the 
comparatively best worst possible consequences. (version of 
the precautionary principle)   
3) THUS (from 1,2): At some future point in time t, we may get 
into a situation where we should deploy the CE technology T.  
4) If we may get into a situation where a technology T ought to 
be deployed, the technology T should be ready for deploy-
ment in the future, provided that there are no more significant 
moral reasons against T being ready for deployment. (precau-
tionary reasoning)  
5) There are no such more significant moral reasons against the 
readiness for deployment of the CE technology T.  
6) THUS (from 3-5): The CE technology T should be ready for 
deployment at a future point in time.  
The lesser-evil argument is based on a (complex) possibility fore-
cast, which already entails a normative assessment (23.1), as well 
as on two precautionary principles (23.2 and 23.4) and the general 
normative assessment that the moral objections to readiness for de-
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ployment do not outweigh the precautionary considerations (23.5). 
The possibility forecast that the deployment of CE could be the 
lesser evil in case a climate emergency occurs is backed up in dif-
ferent ways. High climate sensitivity and failure of emission reduc-
tions may lead to CE being the only remaining possibility of saving 
unique ecosystems (A24, e.g. D. Keith in Goodell 2010:39). The 
argument A25, discussed by Pidgeon & Corner (2010:32), goes 
much further, still: Climate emergencies may well endanger the 
survival of the entire human species; that’s why the worst possible 
consequence of uncompensated catastrophic climate change would 
be worse than the worst possible consequence of CE deployment 
(23.1).  
The lesser-evil argument is criticised in different ways. While 
argument A26 is directed against the complex possibility forecast 
(23.1), the counter-arguments A27 and A29 attack premiss (23.5). 
Argument A26 asserts that CE deployment could further aggravate 
harmful climate impacts, rather than alleviating them. Because this 
uncertainty is irreducible, the objection goes, premiss (23.1) is 
false. In contrast to what (23.1) assumes, not deploying CE might 
actually be the lesser of the two evils. Argument A26 is based on  
• [T11 CE WORSENS CLIMATE IMPACTS] It is certain that the 
future deployment of CE technologies might even worsen the 
most catastrophic anthropogenic climate impacts instead of 
alleviating them.  
Thesis T11 itself is justified or defended by arguments that are as-
signed to the ethics of risk argument cluster (cf. Section 3.3.4). At 
first sight, the formulation of T11 and, hence, of argument A26, 
seems to be unduly sophisticated. Does it not suffice to simply say 
that CE deployment may worsen the whole situation? Well, actual-
ly no, that would not suffice – strictly spoken – to attack the above-
reconstructed lesser-evil argument. The criticism A26 of the lesser-
evil argument thus directly brings up the question as to how far the 
uncertainties of CE technologies (concerning effectiveness and 
side-effects) can be reduced through future research.  
The further arguments A27 and A29 both attack premiss (23.5) 
by claiming that the moral reasons against readiness for deploy-
ment outweigh the precautionary considerations:  
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• [A27 INTENTION MAKES A DIFFERENCE] Intentional interven-
tions into the climate system are (morally) worse than unin-
tentional ones. (Keith 2000) 
• [A29 INTENTIONAL HARM] Deploying CE involves harming 
some (rather than other) people; this reduces the ethical value 
of our lives. (Gardiner 2010b:304) 
By making use of the ethical principle of double effect (cf. also  
K.C. Elliott 2010:18) and by thus assuming that there is a substan-
tial moral difference between bringing about a consequence and 
not preventing it, argument A27, in fact, becomes vulnerable. Here, 
different counter-arguments that defend the lesser-evil argument 
can be anticipated. Referring to R. Elliot’s environmental ethics 
(1982, 1997), one could, for instance, argue that the principle of 
double effect no longer applies in the case of renaturation measures 
that are considered compensations: In such cases, we would defi-
nitely be obliged to act and provide compensations, whereas pas-
sive inaction would be morally wrong (A28).  
The sick-patient analogy (A30) spells out the basic idea of the 
lesser-evil argument by using a metaphor: The Earth could become 
a terminally ill patient whom we prescribe a highly risky, hardly 
understood therapy for she is apparently doomed to die anyway (cf. 
Lovelock in Goodell 2010:106). Just like the lesser-evil argument, 
the sick-patient analogy justifies the central thesis T2 READINESS 
FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE. A detailed reconstruction of this 
argument by analogy reads, A30 SICK-PATIENT ANALOGY,  
1) A terminally ill patient ought to be prescribed a highly risky 
therapy if such therapy is found to be the only treatment op-
tion.  
2) If, in the coming decades, greenhouse gas emissions remain 
unabated and if the climate sensitivity exceeds 6°C, the Earth, 
by about 2050, will resemble – in every relevant respect (es-
pecially as regards the fact that the situation cannot worsen) – 
a terminally ill patient for whom the only treatment option 
consists in a highly risky therapy (i.e., in analogy, in the de-
ployment of a CE technology).  
3) If two situations are equal in every morally relevant respect, 
an option for action in one of these situations ought to be tak-
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en whenever the analogous option ought to be taken in the 
other situation.  
4) THUS (from 1-3): If, in the coming decades, greenhouse gas 
emissions should remain unabated and if the climate sensi-
tivity should exceed 6°C, CE technology T ought to be de-
ployed by about 2050.  
5) It is possible that, in the coming decades, greenhouse gas 
emissions will remain unabated and climate sensitivity will 
exceed 6°C.  
6) If it is possible to get into a situation where a technology T 
ought to be deployed, the technology T should be ready for 
deployment in the future, provided that there are no more 
significant moral reasons against T being ready for deploy-
ment. (precautionary consideration)  
7) There are no such more significant moral reasons against the 
readiness for deployment of the CE technology T.  
8) THUS (from 4-7): The CE technology T should be ready for 
deployment at a future point in time. 
Argument A25, according to which climate change might endanger 
the survival of the entire human species, can be used to justify the 
analogy statement (3.2). This very premiss (3.2) represents the cru-
cial assumption of argument A30. Any relevant difference between 
the two situations considered could defeat the sick-patient analogy. 
Such a difference is pinpointed in argument A31. 
• [A31 NO ABSOLUTE BOTTOM LINE] In contrast to a terminal-
ly ill person, who, at worst, dies, anthropogenic climate im-
pacts, no matter how bad they are, can always become worse.  
The analogy assumed in A30, this objection says, is therefore se-
verely flawed. 
3.3.2 Two-degree Target / 350 ppm Argumentation (Pro)  
A second argumentation in support of thesis T2 READINESS FOR 
DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE results from the stipulation to stabilize 
the atmospheric CO2 concentration at a value of at most 350 ppm 
(cf. Hansen 2009, Greene et al. 2010). (In analogy, the argument 
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cluster could be reconstructed based on a global 2° or 1.5° target.) 
Since the present concentration, however, is clearly above that val-
ue, the 350 ppm target demands a large-scale removal of carbon 
from the atmosphere. The mesostructure of that line of reasoning is 
as follows: 
 
350 ppm / Two-degree Target















Argument Map F 
The argumentation’s structure is comparatively straight. The obli-
gation to have CE technologies ready for deployment (T2) results 
from  
• [A32 READY CE TECHNOLOGIES NEEDED] Only with the help 
of a ready CE technology T can the atmospheric CO2 level 
be reduced to 350 ppm. (Hansen 2009; Greene et al. 2010) 
Arguments A33 and A34 point out that a reduction of the CO2 con-
centration to 350 ppm is required to avoid dangerous climate 
change (Hansen 2009). The following independent evidence is 
provided to substantiate this claim:  
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• Values above 350 ppm may lead to a melting of the ice sheets 
and a catastrophic sea level rise (A35) – a scenario corrobo-
rated by palaeo-climatic data (A36).  
• Values above 350 ppm may cause mass extinctions (A37).  
• At values above 350 ppm, the radiation budget of the Earth is 
not balanced, which could trigger extreme global warming if 
climate sensitivity were high (A38).   
3.3.3 Efficiency and Feasibility Considerations (Pro)  
A third cluster of arguments that support T2 READINESS FOR DE-
PLOYMENT DESIRABLE is made up of efficiency and feasibility 
considerations. 
 














Argument Map G 
The efficiency argument A39 and the closely related do-it-alone 
(A40) and easiness arguments (A41) underline that the deployment 
of CE technologies would be easier and more cost-effective than 
burdensome mitigation or adaptation measures. All of these argu-
ments thus consider CE a substitute for instead of a potential com-
plement to mitigation policies.  
• [A39 EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT] The direct and indirect costs 
of the deployment of CE are clearly below those of mitigation 
and adaptation. (Ott 2010a,b,d; Gardiner 2010b:287; Elliott 
2010:20; Wood in Goodell 2010:129) 
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• [A40 DO-IT-ALONE ARGUMENT] If necessary, CE technolo-
gies can be deployed by a small group of determined nations 
to the benefit of the entire world. (Ott 2010a,b,d)  
• [A41 EASINESS ARGUMENT] CE allows avoiding dangerous 
climate change without changing life styles, habits, and the 
current mode of our economy. (Ott 2010a,b,d) 
Having said this, the easiness argument portrays a certain CE fea-
ture as advantageous (T10) that critics consider as disadvantageous 
(cf. Section 3.3.8).  
The efficiency argument has been discussed and criticised ex-
tensively in the current ethical debate. In particular, the following 
reasons have been invoked against argument A39:  
• [A42 ONLY PARTIAL OFFSET] The CE method T often neu-
tralises only a fraction of all anthropogenic climate impacts, 
e.g. not ocean acidification. In principle, its benefits are obvi-
ously smaller than those of mitigation. (Gardiner 2010b:288; 
Robock 2008a,b; ETC 2009:19)  
• [A43 INDIRECT COSTS UNDERESTIMATED] The CE method T 
is anything but cheap, if one considers all indirect costs that 
arise due to unintended side-effects. (Gardiner 2010b:288) 
• [A44 HARMING OTHERS] We do not compensate for harming 
others by merely providing them with technologies which 
might be used to moderate the harm we have caused. (Gardi-
ner 2010b:293) 
3.3.4 Arguments from Ethics of Risk (Contra)  
Incalculable side-effects and imponderables constitute one of the 
main reasons against CE technology deployment. Arguments from 
ethics of risk, which point out uncertainties in future deployment, 
are primarily supporting thesis T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG and 
make up an argument cluster with a comparatively complex dialec-






































Argument Map H 
Before taking a closer look at some of the relevant arguments, a 
broad outline of the argumentation’s mesostructure is given. There 
are five arguments from ethics of risk which justify that deploying 
CE technologies – today as in the future – would be morally wrong 
(A45, A46, A47, A49, A54). Three of these arguments, namely 
A47, A49, and A54, are further supported and attacked. The un-
seen side-effects argument (A49), in particular, is based on the 
premiss that the uncertainties of CE deployment are irreducible, i.e. 
cannot be reduced substantially through further R&D. This claim, 
in turn, is supported by argument A52. The irreducibility of CE un-
certainties is substantiated through several arguments (A55-A58), 
which all support A52. Argument A52, however, is also dialecti-
cally related to the it-might-get-worse argument (A54). This is be-
cause the latter is based on thesis T11, and T11 is attacked by ar-
gument A53 according to which further R&D could eliminate the 
uncertainties. Argument A52, finally, rebuts this progress-of-R&D 
objection by pointing out irreducible uncertainties.  
The first three justifications of thesis T9 can be outlined as fol-
lows: 
• [A45 TERMINATION PROBLEM] CE measures do not possess 
viable exit options. If deployment is terminated abruptly, rap-
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id and catastrophic climate change ensues. (Ott 2010a,b,d; 
Robock 2008a,b) 
• [A46 NO LONG-TERM CONTROL] Our social systems and in-
stitutions are possibly not capable of controlling risk technol-
ogies on long time scales and of ensuring that they are han-
dled with proper technical care. (Corner & Pidgeon 2010:31) 
• [A47 NO IRREVERSIBLE INTERVENTIONS] CE represents an 
irreversible intervention.  
The prohibition of irreversible interventions, which A47 assumes, 
is justified by:  
• [A48 RETAINING OPTIONS] Irreversible interventions narrow 
the options of future generations in an unacceptable way.  
(Jamieson 1996:330 et seq.) 
A47, in turn, is attacked by:  
• [A50 MITIGATION, TOO] Mitigation, too, is, at least to some 
extent, an irreversible intervention with unseen side-effects. 
(Corner & Pidgeon 2010:28) 
In fact, this objection may also be understood as attacking the fol-
lowing argument, which supports T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG:   
• [A49 UNSEEN SIDE-EFFECTS] As long as the side-effects of 
CE technologies cannot be reliably predicted, their deploy-
ment is morally wrong. (Jamieson 1996:326 et seq.; ETC 
2009:34) 
A51 is another argument which, just like A50, is only vaguely ar-
ticulated in the debate:  
• [A51 NEVER PERFECT FORESIGHT] We do never completely 
foresee the consequences of our actions. (Goodell 2010:135) 
A detailed reconstruction of A49, however, shows that arguments 
A50 and A51 may fail to gain traction, A49, 
1) It is not true that: Further R&D into the CE technology T may 
(a) ensure its effectiveness and (b) exclude catastrophic side-
effects of its deployment.  
2) If further R&D into the CE technology T cannot exclude cat-
astrophic side-effects of its deployment for sure, then side-
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effects of deployment cannot be predicted reliably at any fu-
ture point in time.  
3) As long as the side-effects of a risk technology cannot be re-
liably predicted, its deployment is morally wrong.  
4) The CE technology T is a risk technology.  
5) THUS (from 1-4): A future deployment of the CE technology 
T is in any case (morally) wrong.  
None of these premisses seems to be challenged by A50 or A51. 
Claiming that some uncertainties of CE are irreducible, premiss 
(49.1), moreover, is backed by argument A52.  
• [A52 IRREDUCIBLE UNCERTAINTIES] There are major irreduc-
ible uncertainties regarding the effectiveness and side-effects 
of CE deployment (Cf. Keith 2000:277; Robock 2008a; 
Bunzl 2009) 
Further reasons are given to support that argument:  
• [A55 HUMAN ERROR] Complex technical interventions that 
are sustained on longer time scales are susceptible to human 
error and are hence unpredictable. (Robock 2008a; ETC 
2009:34) 
• [A56 COMPLEXITY OF EARTH SYSTEM] As a consequence of 
the earth system’s complexity, we will never be in a position 
to grasp, let alone quantify, all side-effects of large-scale in-
terventions. (Grunwald 2010; ETC 2009:34) 
• [A57 LARGE-SCALE FIELD TESTS] Only large-scale field 
tests, which effectively amount to full-fledged deployment, 
can robustly demonstrate the effectiveness and reliability of 
CE methods. Hence, we will know whether CE works only 
once we have deployed it.  (Robock 2010) 
• [A58 SOCIO-POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES] The effectiveness 
and reliability of CE presuppose a stable institutional frame-
work over several decades. Such boundary conditions are un-
predictable.  
This last-mentioned argument, however, is qualified by:  
• [A59 SHORT DEPLOYMENT CONCEIVABLE] In case mitigation 
efforts are carried out and highly effective CDR methods are 
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available, SRM might be deployed for no longer than a dec-
ade. (Wigley in Goodell 2010:133) 
A fifth justification of thesis T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG in the 
ethics of risk cluster says that:  
• [A54 IT MIGHT GET WORSE] In the worst case (which is the 
decisive one), CE aggravates catastrophic climate impacts.   
The detailed reconstruction shows that A54, similarly to the lesser-
evil argument (A23), employs a precautionary principle, A54, 
1) It is certain that future deployment of CE technologies might 
even worsen the most catastrophic anthropogenic climate im-
pacts instead of alleviating them. 
2) There are no relevant probability forecasts available regard-
ing the impacts of a future deployment of CE technologies.  
3) If relevant probability forecasts are unavailable and if the 
worst possible consequences of a decision are actually cata-
strophic, one should choose the option for action with the 
comparatively best worst possible consequences. (version of 
the precautionary principle)  
4) THUS (from 1-3): The CE technology T should not be de-
ployed in the future.  
5) THUS (from 4): A future deployment of the CE technology T 
is in any case (morally) wrong.  
Premiss (54.1), which is also shown as thesis T11 CE WORSENS 
CLIMATE IMPACTS in the argument map, is obviously incompatible 
with the view that scientific progress and acquisition of further 
knowledge are possible in the context of CE:  
• [A53 PREDICTIVE PROGRESS POSSIBLE] Scientific research 
might advance our understanding so that we will be in a posi-
tion, when actually deploying CE, to robustly rule out the 
worst case that CE aggravates climate impacts.  
Once again now, considerations about irreducible uncertainties 
arise because the argument A52 IRREDUCIBLE UNCERTAINTIES, 
supported by A55-A58, refutes precisely that further research could 
lead to a substantial reduction of uncertainties. 
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3.3.5 Arguments from Justice and Fairness (Contra) 
The fact that consequences of CE may vary widely on a regional 
scale – both as regards compensation of climate impacts and non-
intended effects – constitutes the starting point of another signifi-
cant group of arguments against the deployment of CE. On the ba-
sis of such regional differences, arguments that stress justice and 
fairness considerations support thesis T9. 
 





















Argument Map I 
In general, arguments from justice and fairness have not yet been 
discussed or elaborated fully in the current CE controversy. The 
common basis of different fairness arguments, which is also re-
ferred to in the literature, reads: 
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• [A60 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS] The uneven distributions of 
regional climate offsets (benefits), costs, and negative side-
effects that go along with CE deployment are deeply unjust. 
(Keith 2000:276; Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:34) 
On the one hand, spelling out of such an argumentation requires 
precise details of the diverse regional impacts of CE deployment. 
On the other hand, the arising regional differences must be as-
sessed normatively according to a given theory or principle of jus-
tice. Such an assessment can be carried out on the basis of the be-
low-mentioned theories, for example. Each of these four theories 
might provide independent arguments in support of A60 (note that 
these arguments are anticipated by the authors of this study as the 
corresponding theories have not yet been explicitly applied to as-
sess CE): 
• [A61 CAPABILITIES] CE deployment will bring about that less 
people possess elementary capabilities to lead a successful, 
good, flourishing human life. (Nussbaum/Sen 1993) 
• [A62 DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE] CE deployment will even ag-
gravate the situation of those who are globally already worst 
off. (Rawls 1975) 
• [A63 EGALITARIANISM] CE deployment widens the existing 
global socio-economic inequalities instead of reducing them.  
• [A64 HUMAN RIGHTS] CE deployment alters the global insti-
tutional and economic conditions such that human rights will 
be realised to a lesser degree. (Pogge 2002) 
Another argument from fairness which, however, does not support 
T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG but directly opposes T2 READINESS 
FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE has been introduced by Stephen 
Gardiner:  
• [A65 OVERCOMING GLOBAL OPPOSITION] Getting global le-
gitimisation (in terms of factual consent and acceptance) for 
CE deployment is no less difficult than winning broad sup-
port for mitigation; if the former could be achieved, global 
mitigation efforts would not be blocked anymore and the 
prime reason for CE would fade away. (Gardiner 2010b:294) 
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Being based on the idea of procedural justice, the argument voiced 
by Gardiner can be understood in two ways. Its first version im-
plies that the central motivation for CE deployment gets lost as 
soon as the problems of achieving concerted multilateral imple-
mentation are overcome. As a matter of fact, should the community 
of states be able to agree on the deployment of CE it could as well 
agree on mitigation policies. With global mitigation on the way, 
Gardiner asserts, there would be no more demand for CE. This first 
version though can be opposed by:  
• [A66 RISK OF HIGH CLIMATE SENSITIVITY] Even with ambi-
tious mitigation policies, we might fail to achieve the two-
degree target such that CE deployment is the lesser of two 
evils. (Keith et al. 2010) 
In the second version, Gardiner’s A65 is based on the pessimistic 
assumption (of one of the variants) of the lesser-evil argument and 
of some supporters of CE that, due to insurmountable clashes of 
interest, the international community will not agree on binding mit-
igation targets and policies anyway. But then, the argument goes, 
there will be no multilateral CE consensus for analogous reasons, 
either. And without such consensus, deployment will cease to be 
desirable.  
3.3.6 Side-effects of Deployment (Contra) 
Arguments pointing out the (uncertain) consequences and side-
effects of CE deployment are already found in the cluster referring 
to ethical risks. Another side-effect argumentation, bearing a great 
similarity to the moral-hazard problem (cf. A9 MITIGATION OB-











Argument Map J 
Not only R&D into but also the deployment of CE could under-
mine further mitigation measures:  
• [A67 IMPEDIMENT TO MITIGATION] The deployment of CE 
makes it highly unlikely that far-reaching mitigation policies 
are implemented and sustained.  
The negative impact on mitigation stems supposedly from the high 
capital intensity of CE measures:  
• [A68 AMORTIZATION EFFECT] Significant investments, re-
quired by capital-intensive CE technologies upfront, will 
amortize only in case the technology is deployed for a suffi-
ciently long period of time. This requires not reducing CO2 
emissions too much.  
3.3.7 Geopolitical Objections (Contra) 
Geopolitical and military strategic effects of having CE technolo-
gies ready for deployment represent the starting points of conse-









Argument Map K 
A69 refers to a problem that is also known from other technology 
debates, e.g. the nuclear energy controversy:  
• [A69 DUAL USE] The CE technology T may potentially serve 
as (the basis for) weapons of mass destruction. (Keith 
2000:275; Corner & Pidgeon 2010:30: Goodell 2010:210-2; 
Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:34) 
Yet another prominent argument of the CE controversy states:  
• [A70 CLIMATE CONTROL CONFLICTS] CE puts future genera-
tions in a position to control the climate. This ability gener-
ates new conflicts and might even bring about climate wars.  
(Hulme 2010:351; Robock 2008a) 
According to that argument, a global thermostat would generate 
more risks and problems than it solves.  
3.3.8 Critique of Technology and Civilization (Contra) 
Objections of a completely different kind are compiled in the ar-
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Argument Map L 
Based on more or less radical normative premisses that express a 
critical attitude towards the scientific-technical civilization, these 
arguments reason that the deployment of CE would be deeply 
wrong.  
• [A71 NO RETHINK] The deployment of CE prevents and 
postpones the urgently needed rethinking in our societies and 
the inevitable reforms of our economies. (Corner & Pidgeon 
2010:32) 
• [A72 EXPLOITATION] CE is just a cover for our ongoing ex-
ploitation of other people, generations, and species. (Gardiner 
2010b:304) 
• [A73 TECHNICAL FIX] CE is a “technical fix”, tinkering with 
symptoms instead of resolving the causes. As such, it is fun-
damentally flawed. (Keith 2000; Gardiner 2010b:303; ETC 
2009:5) 
• [A74 RULING NATURE] CE methods are but another means 
for ruling nature and point into a fundamentally wrong direc-
tion. (Gardiner 2010b:288) 
• [A75 HUBRIS ARGUMENT] CE belongs to a tradition of large-
scale interventions which have ignored the boundaries of 
technical manipulation. It testifies to arrogance and a form of 
self-deceit that will heavily backfire. (Ott 2010a,b,c,d; Gardi-
ner 2010b:303; Jamieson 1996:332; Fleming 2010) 
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3.3.9 Religious, Existentialist, and Environmental-ethics 
Arguments (Contra) 
Arguments that are based on highly specific ethical assumptions 








A80 Betrayal of the
Divine Creation








Argument Map M 
Environmental-ethics considerations emphasize the large-scale loss 
of wilderness through CE deployment and contribute a prominent 
argument to the CE controversy:  
• [A76 LOSS OF INTANGIBLE] The deployment of CE triggers a 
loss of wilderness, originality, and intangibility on unprece-
dented scales. (Ott 2010a,b,d; Keith 2000:277 et seq.; Robock 
2008a) 
In connection with that argument, attention is sometimes called to 
perceptible large-scale changes such as noticeably different sun-
sets. Focusing on the value of wilderness, originality, and natural-
ness, the environmental-ethics argument, however, does not de-
pend on such perceptible side-effects of CE (concerning the envi-
ronmental-ethics debate about the value of wilderness, cf. also 
Birnbacher 2006). Reference to changed sunsets or the loss of blue 
skies (due to SRM) may as well, however, arise from aesthetic 
considerations.  
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Stephen Gardiner articulates two arguments against CE deploy-
ment that appeal to our self-conception as moral persons and may 
thus be called “existentialist”: 
• [A77 ELEMENTARY FAILURE] CE testifies that mankind has 
failed to meet an elementary challenge: To live and to survive 
on this planet as we have found it. (Gardiner 2010b:304; Ja-
mieson 1996:332) 
• [A78 CONCEPTION OF OURSELVES] CE risks undermining our 
conception of ourselves as moral beings. (Gardiner 
2010b:303) 
The latter argument is only hinted at by Gardiner as he asks what 
the decision to implement CE or research into it may tell about us: 
What are humans like that make such decisions? Which are the vir-
tues that guide their actions? 
Two religious arguments have been anticipated from statements 
by the Catholic and Protestant churches, specifically from a social 
encyclical by Pope John Paul II and from the report by an EKD 
(Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland – Evangelical Church in 
Germany) working group on genetic engineering. Although both 
arguments have not yet been introduced into the debate, they estab-
lish an inferential connection between religious beliefs and CE:  
• [A79 CONTEMPT FOR THE GIVEN] By deploying the CE tech-
nology T, we would not perceive and respect nature as what 
is given to humans; rather, nature would become something 
we create intentionally by way of technical reproduction (cf. 
Zimmerli et al. 1997, III.1) 
• [A80 BETRAYAL OF THE DIVINE CREATION] By deploying the 
CE technology T, man subjects the Earth without restraint to 
his will and betrays its prior God-given purpose. (According 
to Pope John Paul II, Centesimus annus, IV, 37; WCC 1998) 
It is important to note that the genetic engineering statement made 
by the EKD working group draws an extremely differentiated pic-
ture and suggests acting carefully without flatly denouncing each 
and every genetic engineering method. In line with this, EKD 
could be assumed to be evaluating CE measures in a likewise dif-
ferentiated way and be supposed not to argue generally against all 
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CE measures with A79. Ultimately, however, such predictions re-
main purely speculative.  
3.4 Alternative Justifications of R&D 
Although alternative research justifications consider R&D into CE 
methods as being a suitable means for a given end, they differ from 
the central justification by specifying an altogether different pur-
pose of research. According to these alternative arguments, re-
search does not aim at making CE methods ready for deployment. 
Rather, research should help, for example, to avoid hasty CE de-
ployment by pointing out the real risks and hazards involved.  
Not least because of the numerous objections to the central R&D 
justification A1 MAKING CE TECHNOLOGIES READY, the CE con-
troversy has turned to the question as to whether there may not be 
other reasons in favour of R&D that are entirely independent of 
such contentious issues as CE deployment or readiness for de-
ployment. Such alternative research justifications are compiled in 
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Argument Map N 
Just like the central justification, each of the alternative justifica-
tions of R&D represents a means-end argument and realises the 
general consequentialist inference pattern T5. The alternative ar-
guments A81-A88 merely differ from the original one by citing 
other targets than deployment readiness to be pursued through CE 
R&D, namely:  
• Avoidance of hasty CE deployment. [A81, A82] (cf. Leisner 
and Müller-Klieser 2010; Keith et al. 2010) 
• Fostering of mitigation policies. [A83, A84] (cf. Keith et al. 
2010; Lovelock in Goodell 2010:107) 
• Planning of a long-term R&D strategy. [A85, A86] 
• Preparation of an informed decision (on deployment in the fu-
ture). [A87, A88] 
The latter of these four variants (A87) comes closest to the central 
justification of R&D. In fact, to prepare an informed decision on 
future deployment, it takes more than just compiling relevant in-
formation: The respective technologies must, in addition, be devel-
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oped to maturity. Hence, A81, A83, and A85 seem to be the only 
genuine alternatives. Each of these alternative arguments evidently 
claims that (i) the respective target shall be reached, (ii) R&D into 
the CE technology contributes to reaching the target, (iii) there are 
no alternatives to R&D in that respect, and (iv) R&D side-effects 
are negligible. In view of these claims, the alternative justifications 
obviously also imply variants of theses T3 SIDE-EFFECTS OF R&D 
NEGLIGIBLE and T4 NO ALTERNATIVES TO R&D (READINESS). 
Unlike the central R&D justification A1 MAKING CE TECHNOLO-
GIES READY, these alternatives, however, steer clear of the com-
prehensive sub-controversy on readiness for deployment (T2). 
Nonetheless, arguments A81, A83, and A85 are partially based on 
other problematic assumptions. Since the allegedly lacking alterna-
tives to R&D will be discussed separately (cf. Section 3.5.1), we 
confine ourselves at this point to questions of effectiveness. It is all 
but obvious why R&D into CE should contribute effectively to 
avoiding hasty deployment (A81) and to fostering mitigation poli-
cies (A83). In fact, the relevant arguments are rather based on the 
assumption that the risks and side-effects of CE are currently sys-
tematically underestimated and that a closer scientific investigation 
of such technologies reveals their limitations (as regards feasibility, 
effectiveness, and acceptability of side-effects). The basic idea be-
hind A83 holds that such revelations would keep the international 
community from relying prematurely on CE and losing sight of 
mitigation policies. 
Finally, there remains one last kind of justification, which is 
briefly mentioned for completeness’ sake. Gardiner discusses an 
argument that emphasizes the neutrality of R&D:  
• [A89 R&D FIRST] R&D should not be constrained; once 
technologies have been developed, a decision can be taken as 
to their deployment. (Gardiner 2010b:288 et seq.) 
However, he discards the argument immediately on the following 
grounds:  
• [A90 R&D NO GOAL IN ITSELF] R&D is no intrinsic goal and 
not for free, either: Research projects compete for limited 
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funds, requiring a choice as to which projects to pursue. 
(Gardiner 2010b:288 et seq.; Jamieson 1996:333 et seq.) 
• [A91 R&D RELATED TO APPLICATIONS] R&D cannot be sep-
arated neatly from its potential results’ applications because 
of psychological as well as socio-economic mechanisms. 
Frequently, automatic applications cannot be avoided. (Gar-
diner 2010b:288 et seq.) 
Also, these objections rebut the following attack against the R&D 
prohibition:    
• [A92 TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL] The CE technology T is, in it-
self, neutral and may be applied for good or bad purposes. Its 
mere development cannot reasonably be prohibited.  (Goodell 
2010:192) 
3.5 Further Arguments 
Further arguments of the CE controversy are related to the lack of 
alternatives to CE R&D (T4), provide direct justifications of the 
R&D prohibition, broach the issue of national bans, and give rea-
sons for the priority of mitigation measures over CE methods. 
3.5.1 Lack of R&D Alternatives 
All R&D justifications decisively depend on the assumption that no 
means are more appropriate for achieving the presumed purpose 
(e.g. readiness for deployment in time) than immediate R&D into 
CE technology T (T4). In spite of its central importance, this pre-
requisite is – as opposed to theses T2 and T3 – hardly paid atten-
tion to. The following argument map compiles considerations that 
are directed against T4 or variants thereof.  
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Argument Map O 
Thesis T4 is a premiss of the central R&D justification. In this con-
text, Gardiner makes the following objection:   
• [A93 POSTPONE R&D] Preparing a technical intervention 
which is to be carried out in 50 years is a waste of resources: 
The technological means upon which the intervention will ul-
timately rely are not available today at all. (Gardiner 
2010b:288 et seq.) 
In line with this, R&D with the goal of developing the respective 
technology to maturity in time may as well be postponed. This ob-
jection obviously presumes that, if at all, the technology T shall not 
be deployed until the remote future (in several decades).  
The premiss of R&D justification A81 AVOIDING HASTY CE 
DEPLOYMENT, however, which claims that there are no alternatives 
to R&D if hasty deployment of the CE technology T is to be avoid-
ed (T12), is opposed by the following obvious consideration:  
• [A94 MORATORIUM] Hasty and premature deployment of CE 
technologies might be avoided (alternatively) by an interna-
tional moratorium.  
A moratorium of that kind has recently been recommended unani-
mously by the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) (cf. 
Tollefson 2010). But not only does such a moratorium undermine 
one of the premisses of R&D justification A81, it also weakens the 
analogous assumption of argument A83 FOSTERING MITIGATION. 
Concerns that a moratorium would hardly be effective and would 
not inhibit R&D lead up to the following objection:  
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• [A95 CLANDESTINE RESEARCH] A moratorium would merely 
push research activities „underground“. (Goodell 2010:200) 
3.5.2 Direct Justifications of R&D Prohibition  
So far, the justification of the R&D prohibition thesis (T6) has 
been linked up with the criticism of theses T2 to T4. Should one of 
the latter be wrong, it follows, through A4-A6, that R&D ought to 
be refrained from. This assumes, though, that the objective of re-
search consists in the development of ready-for-deployment tech-
nologies (cf. Section 3.1). If R&D is being endorsed (thesis T1) for 
alternative reasons, arguments A4-A6 cease to apply. The CE con-
troversy, however, contains further arguments that can be under-
stood as direct justifications of the thesis T6.  
 


















Argument Map P 
Several authors argue that mere CE planning already represents 
part of an unacceptable transfer of risks from present to future gen-
erations: 
• [A96 RISK TRANSFER ARGUMENT] Planning for deployment 
and carrying out R&D today means transferring risks to fu-
ture generations. (Ott 2010a,b,d; Gardiner 2010b:293; Ja-
mieson 1996:331) 
However, argument A96 must (presumably) assume that CE 
measures are conceived as alternatives to mitigation policies or, at 
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least, that such mitigation measures will not be implemented be-
cause of CE planning.  
While A96 is based on a principle of intergenerational ethics, 
A97 is founded on democratic theory:  
• [A97 NO INFORMED CONSENT] R&D into CE requires a 
broad and well-informed consent of those potentially affect-
ed, which is not given. (Jamieson 1996:329 et seq.; Ott 
2010a,b,d; Gardiner 2010b:293 et seq.; Elliott 2010:19) 
The following justification of the R&D obligation, in contrast, 
shows parallels to objections that are critical of civilization and 
technology (cf. Section 3.3.8):  
• [A98 TRUE MOTIVES] R&D into CE is but a rationalisation 
for “passing the buck” on to future generations and for not 
addressing the CO2 problem in earnest. (cf. Gardiner 
2010b:295) 
Eventually, Ott has developed another variant of the risk transfer 
argument where he denounces R&D into CE for possibly burden-
ing future generations with a fatal dilemma:  
• [A99 DILEMMA GENERATION] R&D into CE is likely to lead 
to future dilemmata. (Ott 2010c) 
Dilemmata, however, curb the rights of future generations in an 
unacceptable way (A100).  
3.5.3 The Problem of National Bans  
A particular ethical problem, which has not been discussed explic-
itly in the current debate but is of relevance nonetheless, pertains – 
in a broad sense – to the problem of free-riding: How can limited, 
for example national, bans still be justified if, on a global scale, 
numerous stakeholders do not abide by comparable prohibitions 
anyway? Or, do universal norms which have been justified under 
the assumption that they be collectively accepted and adopted lose 
their authority – for everybody – once sufficiently many agents 
don’t comply? Picking up on these questions, the argument below 
takes for granted the universal research prohibition T6 and con-
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cludes that it would be wrong to enforce such a prohibition on a 
small (e.g. European) scale, A101, 
1) R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R ought not 
to be carried out (immediately). (thesis T6) 
2) Some nations and businesses get away with defying R&D 
prohibition. 
3) If an action A is prohibited (or morally forbidden) to all 
stakeholders but some get away with defying the related 
rules, it seems unjust to uphold the prohibition for the re-
maining stakeholders.  
4) Any prohibition whatsoever ought not to be unjustly upheld 
and imposed on any stakeholder.  
5) THUS (from 1-4): The prohibition of R&D into the CE tech-
nology T ought not to be upheld towards German or Europe-
an stakeholders.  
3.5.4 Priority of Mitigation Policies  
Many objections to R&D into CE, but also numerous justifications 
thereof, are based on the assumption that, prima facie, mitigation – 
rather than CE – represents the more appropriate means for avoid-
ing dangerous climate change (cf. Section 4.3). This comparative 
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Argument Map Q 
Several independent reasons are given to substantiate the priority 
of mitigation:  
• [A102 ARGUMENT FROM REVERSIBILITY] Changes in behav-
iour (induced by mitigation policies) are much more reversi-
ble than technical interventions. (Jamieson 1996:331) 
• [A103 AVOIDING DILEMMATA] We should avoid upfront to 
end up in a situation where we are compelled to choose be-
tween two evils. (Gardiner 2010b:300 et seq.; Elliott 
2010:13) 
• [A104 POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE] Problems should be 
solved by those (generations) who have caused them; there-
fore, mitigation is preferable to CE. (Jamieson 1996:331) 
• [A105 NO RESPECT] An initial act of pollution would even be 
morally wrong if perfect neutralisation of negative impacts 
were possible ex post, because it is an expression of a lack of 
respect. (Hale 2009; Hale and Grundy 2009) 
• [106 WORST CASE] No matter whether CE technologies are 
carried out or not: The worst case, given mitigation policies 
are carried out, is comparatively better than the worst case 




4 Central Issues, Principles, and Problems  
After having introduced the macrostructure of the CE controversy 
and the detailed structure of its sub-debates in the previous chap-
ters, we shall identify and discuss some common questions and 
problems in the chapter below. Since each of these issues pertains 
to several arguments set forth in the CE controversy, they are par-
ticularly relevant to assessing the debate in terms of coherent posi-
tions (cf. Chapter 5).  
4.1 Weighting of Side-effects 
Weighting of side-effects represents a common issue that occurs 
throughout the CE controversy. The proponents of the controversy 
do not explicitly address (e.g. tackle through further arguments) the 
question as to how a series of side-effects, which are partly certain, 
partly probable, and partly possible, are to be evaluated and 
weighted against each other. Depending on which weighting is 
made by the proponents, they will endorse or not endorse the cor-
responding arguments and objections.  
Consequentialist arguments essentially involve a weighting of the 
side-effects of alternative actions while taking the intended conse-
quences into account. In doing so, the positive and beneficial (cer-
tain, probable or merely possible) effects are compared with the 
negative and harmful (certain, probable or merely possible) ones.   
In the CE controversy, one finds two types of argumentation 
that refer to an action’s consequences. To begin with, some of the 
arguments single out presumably crucial positive or negative con-
sequences on the basis of which they then argue for or against 
R&D and deployment. Argument A45 TERMINATION PROBLEM, 
for example, alludes to the lack of an exit option – a single poten-
tial harmful effect of CE deployment – to justify T9 CE DEPLOY-
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MENT WRONG. Arguments from fairness, to give another example, 
denounce CE deployment because of the expected distributional 
effects. Arguments A67, A69, A70, A76, and A96 fall into that 
group, too. Such arguments, which claim that a single consequence 
of some action – let us call it IA – is decisive for the action’s as-
sessment, characteristically consider the further consequences of 
that action (intended and unintended ones) negligible. All such ar-
guments thus must be based on a premiss saying that:  
• There are no moral reasons that outweigh IA and speak 
against (or in favour of) the corresponding action.  
In effect, that premiss implies a hidden, more or less complex 
weighting of consequences, which can be challenged and disputed 
by the proponents of the debate. 
The second way of arguing for or against an action in terms of 
its consequences consists in specifying all relevant effects and 
weighting them against each other. Such explicit and comprehen-
sive weighting of consequences is found in the central argument of 
the sub-debate on R&D side-effects (A8 OVERWHELMING NEGA-
TIVE SIDE-EFFECTS). A8 does not simply confine itself to assessing 
just one single side-effect. Instead, it lists the entire range of harm-
ful side-effects and declares them to outweigh, in toto, the whole 
range of positive effects. Sentence (8.8) represents the decisive 
premiss of A8. To oppose such a premiss, it suffices, in principle, 
to point out that some relevant consequences have not been consid-
ered at all. However, the more comprehensive and exhaustive the 
list of positive and negative consequences (for each of the decision 
options), the more difficult it becomes to criticise such an argument 
in this way. The evaluation of consequentialist arguments that are 
based on a (presumably) comprehensive list of consequences is, in 
fact, tricky. For a proponent who rejects a side-effect-predicting 
premiss of such an argument does not necessarily disapprove of the 
weighting carried out and of the inference that is drawn from the 
weighting. Quite the contrary: She may as well believe the remain-
ing side-effects to provide a sufficient reason for refraining from 
(carrying out) the corresponding action. 
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4.2 Ethics of Risk: Possibilistic Predictions and the Pre-
cautionary Principle  
The CE controversy takes place against the background of massive 
uncertainties. Not only are the side-effects of R&D and deploy-
ment poorly understood, but, what’s more, we can’t even reliably 
predict the effectiveness of CE methods. That’s why more or less 
all arguments in the debate concern – in one or another way – the 
ethics of risk. A central question that arises in this context is how 
rational decisions can be made at all in spite of massive ignorance. 
The arguments where that decision-theoretic problem arises are re-
constructed, in this study, such that they use variants of the precau-
tionary principle.  
So far, the reconstruction of the CE controversy has revealed that 
uncertainties and imponderabilities of CE deployment are para-
mount in the debate. As a matter of fact, limits of scientific under-
standing do not only play a decisive role in the argument cluster on 
ethics of risk. Ultimately, all arguments that refer to consequences 
of CE R&D and deployment must take uncertainties into account. 
The detailed reconstruction of the debate reveals clearly, among 
other things, that the question as to whether current uncertainties 
can be reduced is of special significance (cf. A52 IRREDUCIBLE 
UNCERTAINTIES). 
In a decision situation, the characterisation of one’s uncertain 
foreknowledge determines crucially the way in which one may ar-
gue in favour of or against a certain choice. If, for example, reliable 
probability forecasts are available, the expected utility of alterna-
tive choices may be calculated and compared. Yet, no one would 
seriously claim that faithful probability forecasts of the effects of 
CE R&D and deployment can be made at present. It is due to that 
fact that this study’s reconstruction has been largely based on the 
assumption that, today, CE measures must be assessed with a view 
to their possible effects. Stakeholders face decisions under uncer-
tainty, or “deep uncertainty” (Knight 1921, Kandlikar et al. 2005). 
How to make and justify a choice in such a decision situation is, 
indeed, controversial (Rawls 1975, Harsanyi 1975). Many moral 
philosophers, following Rawls, have argued in favour of a worst-
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case principle, provided certain additional conditions are met (Gar-
diner 2006, Sunstein 2004, Shue 2010). This rule reads:  
If relevant probability forecasts are unavailable and if the 
worst possible consequences of a decision are actually cata-
strophic, one should choose the option for action with the 
comparatively best worst possible consequences. (version of 
the precautionary principle)  
This decision rule, moreover, represents a variant of the Principle 
of the Priority of Bad over Good Prognoses formulated by Hans 
Jonas (Jonas 2003, p. 70 et seq.). According to Jonas, “it is in par-
ticular in matters of a certain magnitude, i.e. matters of apocalyptic 
potential, that greater weight must be given to the prognosis of 
doom than to that of bliss” (p. 76, own translation).  
The above worst-case principle is explicitly assumed in the re-
constructed arguments A23 LESSER-EVIL and A54 IT MIGHT GET 
WORSE. In addition, many other arguments that could not be re-
constructed in detail yet (for example A60, A69, A70, A106) pre-
sumably rely on it, as well. It is noteworthy that the worst-case rule 
figures both in arguments that tend to be in favour of CE as well as 
in arguments that speak against it. This means that a commitment 
to risk-averse precautionary thinking alone does not settle the CE 
controversy. 
4.3 The Priority of Mitigation Policies 
The priority of mitigation policies (T14) is taken for granted by 
various arguments, in particular by the moral-hazard objections and 
the alternative justifications of CE research. Conversely, though, 
some arguments contradict more or less explicitly the thesis that 
mitigation policies take, in general, priority. This holds especially 
for the efficiency and feasibility argumentation, which considers 
CE methods a favourable substitute for mitigation policies. Most of 
the arguments of the CE controversy, however, are compatible with 
the priority of mitigation policies.  
As already indicated in Section 3.5.4, various arguments of the CE 
controversy assume that the avoidance of a dangerous climate 
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change through drastic CO2 reduction is generally to be preferred 
to the deployment of CE technologies, which merely aims at ex 
post compensation of impacts. That thesis, which is supported by 
arguments A102-A106, enters, in particular, into the below consid-
erations:  
• The moral-hazard argument (A9), which is one of the most 
frequently cited objections to R&D into CE, implicitly as-
sumes that mitigation policies are to be preferred to CE de-
ployment. For otherwise, triggering a reduction of mitigation 
efforts would not provide a reason against the preparation of 
(i.e. the research into) CE measures.   
• By the same token, argument A67 IMPEDIMENT TO MITIGA-
TION, according to which CE deployment hampers emission 
reduction, presumes that priority is given to mitigation.  
• The priority of mitigation strategies, however, figures also in 
one of the alternative justifications of R&D into CE, namely 
in A83 FOSTERING MITIGATION. This argument favours CE 
R&D for the very reason that it may strengthen mitigation ef-
forts.  
Hence, there are both justifications of and objections to CE R&D 
which rely, more or less explicitly, on the claim that mitigation 
measures take priority. 
Still further arguments are closely related to the justifications of 
the priority of mitigation. Instead of assuming thesis T14 as a 
premiss, they – or very similar considerations – actually support 
T14:  
• Arguments A71-A75, which express a fundamental critique 
of technology and civilization, seem to be based on far-
reaching normative assumptions from which the priority of 
mitigation measures could be deduced as well.  
• The direct justifications of the R&D prohibition – A96 RISK 
TRANSFER ARGUMENT and  A98 TRUE MOTIVES – are based 
on variants of the polluter-pays principle which can also be 
drawn upon to support thesis T14 (cf. A104).    
Next, there are some arguments in the controversy which explicitly 
contradict thesis T14 MITIGATION FIRST: namely the efficiency and 
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feasibility argumentation (A39-A41). These arguments consider 
CE measures a (potential) substitute for mitigation, which possess-
es diverse advantages (efficiency, feasibility, easiness). Corre-
spondingly, they reject the thesis that mitigation is generally to be 
preferred.   
In summary, some arguments rely on T14, others seem to imply 
it, and a third group of arguments contradict T14. Nevertheless, the 
great majority of arguments of the controversy are independent of 
T14. They can be coherently adopted no matter if one accepts T14 
or not. In particular, the main justifications of T2 READINESS FOR 
DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE, i.e. the lesser-evil argumentation and 
the 350 ppm argumentation, don’t conflict with T14 – whereas they 
are not based on it, either. These two justifications remain intact, 
even if one believes mitigation policies to be generally more ap-
propriate and better than CE deployment.    
4.4 The Entanglement of Moral and Extra-moral Argu-
ments  
Within the CE controversy, moral and extra-moral considerations 
seem to be deeply interwoven. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the moral arguments also make use of descriptive premisses such 
as forecasts of an action’s consequences.  
It is evident from the reconstruction of the CE controversy that 
there is a profound entanglement of moral and extra-moral consid-
erations in more than just one respect. 
Firstly, the diverse arguments always make both normative and 
descriptive assumptions. Accordingly, they can be refuted for two 
kinds of reasons: factual or normative ones. The arguments from 
fairness (A60-A64), for instance, claim, on the one hand, that CE 
deployment would have very different regional effects. That claim 
constitutes a descriptive premiss which concerns mere matters of 
fact. On the other hand, the assumed regional differences are 
claimed to be unjust, which, in turn, represents a normative premiss 
of the argument. Both, descriptive and normative premisses, are 
found as well in the deontological arguments, which do not assess 
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actions on the basis of their respective consequences. The religious 
arguments (A79, A80), for example, claim that (a) CE deployment 
falls under a certain type of action (descriptive) and that (b) any 
action of that type is morally wrong (normative). Finally, to give 
one last example, the lesser-evil argument (A23), too, relies on 
both (mainly) descriptive (23.1) and normative premisses (23.2, 
23.4, and 23.5). In general, the descriptive premisses give rise to 
expert debates about specific matters of fact and data. Hence, this 
is where the moral controversy smoothly connects with scientific 
controversies in different disciplines.   
Secondly, the central normative theses are supported by moral 
arguments as well as legal arguments and arguments based on spe-
cial interests, or so it seems. There are presumably reasons other 
than the moral ones that support R&D into CE and that’s why mor-
al and extra-moral considerations are entangled in the debate. 
However, one needs to be careful here. This study’s reconstruction 
solely considers a moral “ought”, i.e. refers to moral obligations 
and prohibitions only. The thesis that there is a moral obligation to 
research into CE, however, must in no way be confounded with the 
claim that e.g. legal arguments or economic reasons make research 
into CE compulsory (cf. also Section 1.2). Strictly speaking, such 
arguments warrant not one and the same, but refer to different and 
independent theses. For the sake of clarity, we should add the at-
tribute “moral” – at least mentally – whenever an argument or the-
sis speaks of “ought”, “must” or “may” –  of obligations or prohibi-
tions. Moreover, such a conceptual differentiation finally reveals 
that for some arguments of the CE controversy, there may well be 
alternative interpretations which do not necessarily imply moral 
obligations or prohibitions. The efficiency argument (A39), for in-
stance, can be re-interpreted as a justification of an economic ad-
vice: Economic reason demands that … And such a claim would be 
nothing but a hypothetical imperative: If maximisation of econom-
ic benefit is the only target we pursue, then we ought to …  Once 
more: It is essential to bear in mind that such a statement is entirely 
different from the moral thesis T2. The dual-use argument (A69), 
too, can be re-interpreted in a non-moral way. Accordingly, it justi-
fies a geopolitical recommendation: If the achievement of peace 
and international stability is the only target we pursue, then … Un-
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like interpretations that do not invoke any moral concepts, the mor-
al reconstructions are based on important additional premisses 
through which the intended moral claim can be derived (cf. 4.1). In 
this sense, the moral reasons that have been reconstructed in this 
study represent the more sophisticated arguments.  
Thirdly, and finally, there is an intricate relationship between 
legal and governance issues on the one hand and the moral argu-
mentation that has been reconstructed on the other hand. Thus, it 
depends – among other things – on institutional set-ups whether the 
factual premisses assumed in the moral arguments turn out to be 
true or false. Whether, for example, R&D into CE de facto results 
in a reduction of mitigation efforts depends, not least, on the legal 
conditions under which R&D is being carried out. That’s why the 
reconstructed moral controversy may well provide a touchstone of 
legal and governance structures: A suitable legal and institutional 
framework for CE R&D should ideally ensure that the premisses of 
relevant objections to CE research become false. And legal or po-
litical-science analyses may investigate for which institutional pro-
visions this is the case. 
4.5 Fundamental Assumptions and Weltanschauung 
One may broadly distinguish two types of arguments in the CE 
controversy: Those which make controversial ideological assump-
tions, and those which do not rely on strong normative premisses 
but which involve, at most, contentious descriptive assumptions or 
basically shared principles whose concrete application is contro-
versial. The first category comprises, in particular, the religious, 
existentialist, and environmental-ethics arguments, the efficiency 
and feasibility consideration, the arguments that rely on a critique 
of technology and civilization, the research neutrality reasoning, 
the arguments from fairness, and some arguments belonging to the 
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Argument Map S 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the arguments of the CE con-
troversy are made up of both descriptive and normative – or, to be 
more exact, moral – premisses. Two types of arguments can be 
roughly distinguished according to their specific moral assump-
tions (cf. argument maps R and S):  
1. Arguments that rely on disputed normative assumptions (tied 
to a specific Weltanschauung) – be it in the form of a general 
moral rule or in the form of a value theory (axiology) that is 
used to assess consequences of an action. Such assumptions, 
for example, may pertain to the just organization of our socie-
ty or the role of technologies and markets.  
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2. Arguments that don’t rely on strong normative premisses but 
that possibly make contentious descriptive assumptions or 
that assume basically shared normative principles whose con-
crete application, though, might be disputed.  
Of course, these two types of arguments cannot in any way be sep-
arated neatly. Moreover, the following classification is partly based 
on the authors’ subjective judgment.  
The first category of ideological considerations includes: Reli-
gious, existentialist, and environmental-ethics arguments (Section 
3.3.9), efficiency and feasibility considerations (Section 3.3.3), the 
critique of technology and civilization (Section 3.3.8), research 
neutrality arguments (cf. Section 3.4), arguments from justice and 
fairness (Section 3.3.5), and the arguments “Commercial Control” 
(A11) and “Political Economy” (A14) from the sub-controversy 
about R&D side-effects. The authors of this study take it that these 
arguments and considerations are based on normative premisses on 
which consensus can hardly be obtained.  
The second category of arguments, in contrast, comprises: The 
lesser-evil argumentation and the 350 ppm argumentation in favour 
of thesis T2 (cf. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2); the arguments “Mitiga-
tion Obstruction” (A9), “Unstoppable Development” (A10), “Field 
Tests” (A12), and “Techno Escalation” (A13) from the sub-
controversy about R&D side-effects; the  “Termination Problem” 
(A45) and other considerations from ethics of risk (cf. Section 
3.3.4); the military-geopolitical objections (Section 3.3.7); the as-
sessment of deployment side-effects (section 3.3.6); and the direct 
justifications of the R&D prohibition, namely the arguments “Risk 
Transfer” (A96), “No Informed Consent” (A97), and “Dilemma 
Generation” (A99). While consensus is likely to be achieved on the 
normative premisses of these arguments, the descriptive assump-
tions tend to be controversial.  
The above classification of arguments, however, by no means 
implies that arguments classified as (rather) ideological may be ne-
glected or are of little significance: Firstly, the normative premisses 
of the type-one arguments could still be less controversial than the 
descriptive premisses of the type-two arguments. And, secondly, it 
is always conceivable that proponents in a debate, while starting 
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from different ideological assumptions, will nonetheless agree with 
regard to the central thesis – albeit for different reasons. The argu-
ments that are based on strong ideological premisses, thus, are not 
necessarily less significant than other arguments when it comes to 
assessing the overall controversy.  
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5 Coherent Positions and their Logico-
argumentative Implications  
Analysing a complex controversy as an argument map allows to 
check proponent positions (actually or possibly held) for coher-
ence. A core position, which consists in accepting or rejecting cer-
tain arguments and theses, has logico-argumentative implications 
that go beyond the core position itself because (i) one is bound to 
accept the logical consequences of the sentences one accepts and 
(ii) one must reject the direct objections to one’s core position. 
Proponents endorsing R&D into some CE method, thus, are 
obliged to reject the relevant objections to R&D into CE; propo-
nents rejecting CE R&D have to specify on which points they disa-
gree with the diverse research justifications. It is these very consid-
erations that are relevant when drafting coherent political positions. 
For illustrative purposes, the following positions can be checked 
for coherence: Endorsement of SRM research for reasons of easi-
ness and efficiency; endorsement of R&D into ocean fertilization 
to detect the associated risks; rejection of SRM R&D on account of 
basic considerations from democratic theory and fairness; en-
dorsement of CDR development for the purpose of achieving ambi-
tious climate targets in the future.  
Argument maps serve to structure controversies and reveal how 
different considerations are related to each other. In addition, they 
can be used to check positions, which proponents do or might 
adopt in a controversy, for coherence. Argument maps, however, 
do not mark out one single position as being particularly plausible 
or well-founded. Quite the contrary: There are always various ad-
missible (coherent) points of views between which argumentation 
analysis (and, hence, ethics) cannot further decide. In this context, 
to say that a position is not coherent means that it does not 
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acknowledge the logico-argumentative consequences resulting 
from its concessions or that it gets tangled up in contradictions.  
For scientific policy advice, checking the diverse positions in a 
debate for coherence may very well represent the most important 
benefit of argument analysis. Such checking enables political 
stakeholders to trace whether they have taken into account all rele-
vant considerations with a view to their own position. In particular, 
argument analysis can be of significant help already in the initial 
process of setting up a position. At this stage, provisional and par-
tial positions can be pictured and thought through tentatively based 
on the argument maps. That’s what this concluding chapter is all 
about: It aims to point out how the argument maps of the CE con-
troversy can be used to clarify particular positions. The procedure 
of checking positions for their coherence is demonstrated by exam-
ples, i.e. by mapping out four arbitrary, merely illustrative posi-
tions. These positions do not have any special status; in particular, 
the argument maps don’t show these positions to be extremely im-
portant, well-founded or anything like that. They have been chosen 
such that they give at least an idea of the broad spectrum of con-
ceivable coherent positions.  
Proponents can assume positions by accepting or rejecting the 
arguments and theses in a controversy. In that context, acceptance 
and rejection are defined as follows: 
• Acceptance of a thesis =def the thesis is accepted as true;  
• Acceptance of an argument =def all premisses as well as the 
conclusion of the argument are accepted as true;   
• Rejection of a thesis =def the thesis is considered to be false;  
• Rejection of an argument =def at least one premiss is consid-
ered to be false.   
It is important to bear in mind that in order to (coherently) reject an 
argument, it suffices to say which of its premisses one does not ac-
cept; it is not necessary to justify why the respective premiss is be-
lieved to be false.  
To describe a position assumed in the CE controversy, it is not 
enough, however, to state which arguments and theses of the 
above-presented reconstruction are being accepted or rejected. This 
is because, strictly speaking, the arguments are not made up of sen-
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tences that can be true or false – the argument maps merely contain 
argument patterns which employ two types of placeholders (cf. 
Section 1.3). So, before one can adopt a position by accepting or 
rejecting arguments and theses, two things have to be done: First, 
one has to specify which CE technologies one addresses (place-
holder “T”) and, second, one has to determine which kind of R&D 
one considers (placeholder “R”). Consequently, the four exemplary 
positions are described hereunder by (1.) specifying the CE tech-
nology “T” and the type of R&D “R”, (2.) pointing out the core po-
sition (acceptance and rejection of theses and arguments), and (3.) 
explaining the logico-argumentative obligations arising from the 
core position.  
5.1 First Position: SRM is More Efficient than 
Mitigation 
The first illustrative position discusses the technologies of cloud-
albedo enhancement (Royal Society 2009, p. 27) and recommends 
developing them immediately for reasons of efficiency (cf. argu-
ment maps T and U). The SRM technology of cloud-albedo en-
hancement is aimed at increasing oceanic cloud formation by in-
jecting particles into lower atmospheric layers to increase the direct 
reflection of incident sunlight.  
Subject Matter of the Position 
• T = Cloud-albedo enhancement 
• R = Technology development 
In essence, the position justifies immediate R&D into cloud-albedo 
enhancement by saying that measures of that kind are more effi-
cient than emission reduction (mitigation). Hence, besides the cen-
tral R&D justification (A1 MAKING CE TECHNOLOGIES READY), 
also arguments A39 EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT and A41 EASINESS 
ARGUMENT are accepted. 
Core Position 
• Acceptance: T1-T5, A1, A2, A39, A41 
• Rejection: – 
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The above core position possesses a number of logico-argumenta-
tive implications: Whoever assumes the core position must also ac-
cept or reject further arguments and theses for reasons of coher-
ence. Most evidently, the position in question is bound to reject the 
prohibition of R&D into cloud-albedo enhancement. Hence, any 
direct justification of such an R&D prohibition must be rejected as 
well (cf. Section 3.5.2). In addition, the direct objections (A42-
A44) to the efficiency argument need to be rejected. Efficiency 
considerations, moreover, conflict with thesis T14 according to 
which mitigation ought to be principally preferred to CE deploy-
ment (cf. Section 4.3). Accordingly, the above position is bound to 
reject T14 and all its justifications (A102-A106). Moreover, all ar-
guments that assume the priority of mitigation (see Section 4.3), 
namely A9, A67, A83, must be discarded. Further consequences 
arise from accepting T2. Not only does the position have to reject  
the geopolitical-military objections and argument A65 against T2, 
but thesis T9 (which holds that deployment of cloud-albedo en-
hancement is morally wrong) must be denied, too. Consequently, 
all justifications of T9 are to be rejected. In order to coherently 
maintain that R&D side-effects are negligible (T3), it is necessary 
to reject at least argument A8. Either the position under review 
weights the side-effects of R&D differently (that is negates premiss 
(8.8)), or it contests that some of the predicted R&D side-effects 
are actually negative and possible (or probable). The latter has al-
ready been accomplished through the rejection of A9. Finally, the 
core position is required to reject the attack (A93) on T4 (NO AL-
TERNATIVES TO R&D). 
Logico-argumentative Implications 
• Acceptance: T10 
• Rejection: T6, any direct justification of T6; objections to the 
efficiency argument A42-A44; T14, each of the arguments 
A102-A106 as well as A9, A67, and A83; geopolitical-
military objections (A69, A70), and A65; T9, any justifica-
tion of T9; argument A8; objection (A93) to the thesis that 
there are no alternatives to R&D  
• Neutral (selected arguments and theses): Lesser-evil argu-
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Argument Map U: First Position 
5.2 Second Position: Disclosing the Risks of Ocean Fer-
tilization 
The second exemplary position favours R&D into ocean fertiliza-
tion (Royal Society 2009, p. 16) with the objective of disclosing 
the risks and side-effects of such interventions (cf. argument maps 
V and W). Ocean fertilization refers to the process of introducing 
nutrients (mostly iron) into oligotrophic oceans to boost primary 
production (algae growth, among other things) and to sequester 
CO2 from the atmosphere. 
Subject Matter of the Position 
• T = Ocean fertilization 
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• R = Risk assessment 
In essence, the position justifies R&D by saying that risk research 
tends to prevent (rather than foster) premature technology deploy-
ment (A81 AVOIDING HASTY CE DEPLOYMENT) and supports mit-
igation efforts (A83 FOSTERING MITIGATION). The deployment of 
ocean fertilization is considered to be morally wrong.  
Core Position 
• Acceptance: T1, T5, A81-A84, variants of T3 and T12 (cf. 
Section 3.4), T9 
• Rejection: – 
The general prohibition of R&D into the risks of ocean fertilization 
(T6) must be rejected together with all of its justifications (among 
other things, thesis T7 and premiss 7.3 of argument A7 can be re-
jected; the direct justifications of the R&D prohibition, moreover, 
seem to be aimed at technology development). The acceptance of 
T9, in addition, implies that T2 must be rejected. Accordingly, all 
justifications of T2 have to be rejected as well: The lesser-evil ar-
gument (A23) could be discarded because, for example, ocean fer-
tilization is not suited as an emergency option anyway (premiss 
(23.1) is wrong). For the same reason, the sick-patient analogy 
(A30) appears to be lopsided, too. On top of that, the efficiency and 
feasibility considerations must be rejected just as the 350 ppm ar-
gumentation. Further logico-argumentative implications result 
from the fact that variants of T3 and T12 are accepted. Thus, the 
second position, too, is bound to claim that the side-effects of R&D 
(i.e. the side-effects of R&D into the risks of ocean fertilization) 
are negligible. Argument A8 could be rejected, for example, by in-
sisting that such specific risk research by no means leads to a re-
duction of mitigation efforts. In doing so, A9 would be discarded 
as well. In addition, the position must reject objections to thesis 
T12: Moratoriums or legally binding agreements, the position is 
bound to claim, are no suitable alternatives for reaching the respec-
tive R&D targets (i.e. enhancement of mitigation, avoidance of 
hasty deployment).  
Logico-argumentative Implications 
• Acceptance: T14 
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• Rejection: T6, any justification of T6; T2, any justification of 
T2; A8, some of the arguments A9-A15 (A10 and A12 in the 
argument map); objection A94 to variants of T12  
• Neutral (selected arguments and theses): Objections to T2, 




Alternative Justifications of R&D
R&D Neutrality
Dir. Just. of 
R&D Proh.
Central R&D Justification
R&D Side-effects Priority of Mitigation
" 












































Argument Map W: Second Position 
5.3 Third Position: No SRM Development 
The third exemplary position argues against the development of 
aerosol-based SRM technologies (Royal Society 2009, p. 29) (cf. 
argument maps X and Y). Such methods are aimed at increasing 
the share of the reflected and re-emitted solar radiation by strato-
spheric sulphur aerosol injection.     
Subject Matter of the Position 
• T = Aerosol-based SRM 
• R = Technology development 
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Essentially, the position subscribes to the prohibition of R&D into 
SRM technologies (T6) by holding that the respective measures 
(1.) solely end up transferring risks to future generations 
(A96 RISK TRANSFER ARGUMENT), and (2.) cannot obtain in-
formed global consent anyway (A97 NO INFORMED CONSENT). 
The position, moreover, accepts the priority of mitigation policies 
by agreeing that problems should be solved by those who have 
caused them (A104 POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE).  
Core Position 
• Acceptance: T6, A96, A97, T14, A104 
• Rejection: – 
For reasons of coherence, anyone who considers the development 
of aerosol-based SRM technologies wrong is bound to negate the 
opposite R&D obligation (T1). From this, it evidently follows that 
all justifications of the R&D obligation must be rejected as well. 
On the one hand, it is necessary to discard the central consequen-
tialist R&D justification (A1). On the other hand, all of the alterna-
tive R&D justifications (A81-A88) must also be rejected. If, as will 
be assumed below, the position accepts the general principle T5, 
one of the theses T2-T4 must definitely be discarded. Depending 
on which of the latter theses is being discarded, one gets confront-
ed with additional logico-argumentative implications: Denial of, 
for example, T2 implies that each justification of T2 must be re-
jected (see Section 5.2). The efficiency and feasibility considera-
tions must be refuted at any rate, since they run counter to the pri-
ority of mitigation (T14) (see Section 4.3). Concerning the argu-
ment cluster “Neutrality of R&D”, arguments A89 and A92 need to 
be rejected. The third position outlined in this subsection is, how-
ever, uncommitted to many of the reconstructed arguments. It is, 
for instance, not bound to accept the objections to theses T2-T4. 
These objections may be cited to back up the rejection of T2-T4, 
but they may as well be discarded.  
Logico-argumentative Implications 
• Acceptance: – 
• Rejection: T1, any justification of T1, one of the theses T2-
T4, and any justification of the latter (T2 in the argument 
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map, and all justifications of T2); A39-A41; A89 and A92 of 
the R&D neutrality argumentation  
• Neutral (selected arguments and theses): Objections to T2 
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Argument Map Y: Third Position 
5.4 Fourth Position: Developing Air Capture Technolo-
gies  
The fourth exemplary position holds that R&D into air capture 
technologies ought to be carried out (Royal Society 2009, p. 15) in 
order to attain ambitious climate protection goals such as the 
350 ppm target (cf. argument maps Z and AA). Using energy-
intensive chemical methods, the technologies referred to capture 
CO2 directly from the ambient air, so that it can be stored subse-
quently.   
Subject Matter of the Position 
• T = Air capture 
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• R = Technology development  
In essence, the position accepts theses T1-T5, the central, conse-
quentialist justification of the development of air capture methods, 
and the 350 ppm argumentation (A32-A38).   
Core Position 
• Acceptance: T1-T5, A1, A2, 350 ppm argumentation 
• Rejection: – 
Just like the first and second positions, the fourth one, too, is bound 
to reject the research prohibition thesis (T6) and the direct justifica-
tions of a prohibition of air capture development. In this particular 
case, one might claim that the development of CDR technologies 
involves much less intergenerational risk transfer than the devel-
opment of SRM methods (against A96), and that informed consent 
could be achieved much more easily (against A97). Besides, the 
position must reject objection A8 to the negligibility of R&D side-
effects (T3). It could try to insist, for example, that CDR measures 
hardly bear any moral-hazard risk and that, hence, argument A9 
can be discarded. Next, the direct objections to T2 must be reject-
ed. Some of these objections (A69 and A70) seem to concern SRM 
only, anyway. The position must also reject thesis T9, according to 
which it would be morally wrong to deploy air capture methods, 
and, along with this, any justification of T9. In order to do so, one 
might claim, once again, that some of the arguments, e.g. the ter-
mination problem (A45), solely apply to SRM technologies any-
way. But, in addition, several substantial objections (e.g. A67-A68) 
must be rejected, too. To be able to coherently adhere to T4, the 
position under review finally needs to reject A93: Since, to be ef-
fective in time, air capture technologies have to be deployed as ear-
ly as possible, postponing R&D, it might be claimed, is no appro-
priate alternative to starting R&D immediately.  
Logico-argumentative Implications 
• Acceptance: – 
• Rejection: T6, any justification of T6; A8 (e.g. through rejec-
tion of A9); direct objections to T2; T9 and any of its justifi-
cations; A93   
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• Neutral (selected arguments and theses): Efficiency and fea-
sibility considerations (A39-A41), lesser-evil argument 
(A23), alternative justifications of R&D (A81-A88), priority 
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Theses in Full 
T1 R&D OBLIGATION 
R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R ought to be car-
ried out immediately.  
T2 READINESS FOR DEPLOYMENT DESIRABLE 
The CE technology T should be ready for deployment at a future 
point in time.   
T3 SIDE-EFFECTS OF R&D NEGLIGIBLE 
The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect 
R are negligible as compared to T being [probably] ready for de-
ployment in time.  
T4 NO ALTERNATIVES TO R&D (READINESS) 
There are no more appropriate alternatives to immediate R&D into 
the CE technology T under the aspect R which bring about that T is 
probably ready in time.  
T5 PRINCIPLE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 
An action A ought to be carried out if the following conditions are 
met: 1. The objective O ought to be realised; 2. A [probably] brings 
about realisation of O; 3. There is no alternative action A' that 
would bring about realisation of O while at the same time being 
more appropriate than A; 4. The side-effects of A are negligible as 
compared to O [probably] being realised. 
T6 R&D PROHIBITION 
R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R ought not to be 
carried out (immediately).    
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T7 PRECONDITIONS OF PERMISSIBLE R&D 
R&D into a technology under the aspect R may be carried out only 
if each of the following conditions is met: 1. There is a chance of 
achieving readiness for deployment; 2. The direct costs of R&D are 
reasonable; 3. The readiness for deployment of the technology out-
weighs, considering the probability that such readiness be actually 
achieved, the expected certain, probable, and possible side-effects 
of R&D; 4. It is desirable to have the technology ready for deploy-
ment. 
T8 PRINCIPLE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 
A goal-oriented action A should be carried out only if each of the 
following conditions is met: 1. There is a chance of achieving the 
objective targeted by A; 2. The direct effort of action A is reasona-
ble; 3. The objective pursued by the action outweighs, considering 
the probability that the objective be actually achieved, the expected 
certain, probable, and possible side-effects; 4. The objective target-
ed by A is desirable. 
T9 CE DEPLOYMENT WRONG 
A future deployment of the CE technology T is in any case (moral-
ly) wrong.  
T10 CE EASY 
Implementation of the CE technology is comparatively easy.  
T11 CE WORSENS CLIMATE IMPACTS 
It is certain that the future deployment of CE technologies might 
even worsen the most catastrophic anthropogenic climate impacts 
instead of alleviating them.  
T12 NO ALTERNATIVES (PRE-EMPTION) 
There are no alternative measures leading to the avoidance of a has-
ty deployment of the CE technology T while at the same time being 
more appropriate than immediate R&D into the latter under the as-
pect R.  
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T13 NO NATIONAL R&D BANS 
The prohibition of R&D into the CE technology T should not be 
upheld and enforced vis-à-vis, e.g., German or European agents.  
T14 MITIGATION FIRST 
Mitigation, as a climate policy option, is preferable to CE deploy-
ment.  
Arguments in Full 
A1 MAKING CE TECHNOLOGIES READY 
1) The CE technology T should be ready for deployment at a fu-
ture point in time.  
2) Immediate R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R 
[probably] brings about that T is ready in time. 
3) There are no more appropriate alternatives to immediate R&D 
into the CE technology T under the aspect R which bring about 
that T is ready in time while at the same time being more ap-
propriate than immediate R&D into the CE technology.  
4) The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R are negligible as compared to T being [probably] ready 
for deployment in time.  
5) R&D into a technology ought to be carried out immediately if 
the following conditions are met: 1. The technology should be 
ready for deployment at a future point in time; 2. Immediate 
R&D [probably] brings about that the technology will be ready 
for deployment; 3. There are no alternatives which bring about 
that the technology is ready in time while at the same time being 
more appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The side-effects of 
R&D are negligible as compared to the technology being ready 
for deployment. 
6) THUS (from 1-5): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought to be carried out.  
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A2 SPECIALISATION 
1) An action A ought to be carried out if the following conditions 
are fulfilled: 1. The objective O ought to be realised; 2. Action 
A [probably] brings about realisation of O; 3. There is no alter-
native action A' that would bring about realisation of O and is 
more appropriate than A at the same time; 4. The side-effects of 
A are negligible as compared to O [probably] being realised. 
2) THUS (from 1): R&D into a technology ought to be carried out 
immediately if the following conditions are met: 1. The tech-
nology should be ready for deployment at a future point in time; 
2. Immediate R&D [probably] brings about that the technology 
will be ready for deployment; 3. There are no alternatives which 
bring about that the technology is ready in time while at the 
same time being more appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The 
side-effects of R&D are negligible as compared to the technolo-
gy being ready for deployment. 
A3 DEONTIC OPPOSITION 
1) R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R should not be 
carried out (immediately).  
2) A certain measure M ought to be taken only if M is not prohib-
ited.  
3) THUS (from 1, 2): It is false that R&D into the CE technology T 
ought to be carried out.  
A4 READINESS NOT DESIRABLE 
1) R&D into a technology under the aspect R may be carried out 
only if each of the following conditions is met: 1. There is a 
chance of achieving readiness for deployment; 2. The direct 
costs of R&D are reasonable; 3. The readiness for deployment 
of the technology outweighs, considering the probability that 
such readiness be actually achieved, the expected certain, prob-
able, and possible side-effects of R&D; 4. It is desirable to have 
available an adequate technology ready for deployment.  
2) It is not desirable at all to have available at a future point in time 
a CE technology T that is ready for deployment.   
3) THUS (from 1, 2): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought not to be carried out (immediately).  
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A5 SIDE-EFFECTS UNACCEPTABLE 
1) R&D into a technology under the aspect R may be carried out 
only if each of the following conditions is met: 1. There is a 
chance of achieving readiness for deployment; 2. The direct 
costs of R&D are reasonable; 3. The readiness for deployment 
of the technology outweighs, considering the probability that 
such readiness be actually achieved, the expected certain, prob-
able, and possible side-effects of R&D; 4. It is desirable to have 
available an adequate technology ready for deployment.  
2) The (probable) future readiness for deployment of the CE tech-
nology T by no means outweighs the expected certain, probable, 
and possible side-effects of R&D into T.    
3) THUS (from 1, 2): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought not to be carried out (immediately).  
A6 BETTER ALTERNATIVES 
1) R&D into a technology under the aspect R may be carried out 
only if each of the following conditions is met: 1. There is a 
chance of achieving readiness for deployment; 2. The direct 
costs of R&D are reasonable; 3. The readiness for deployment 
of the technology outweighs, considering the probability that 
such readiness be actually achieved, the expected certain, prob-
able, and possible side-effects of R&D; 4. It is desirable to have 
available an adequate technology ready for deployment.  
2) The direct costs of R&D into a CE technology are only reason-
able if there are no better alternatives, i.e. if there are no alterna-
tives to R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R that 
bring about that T will be ready for deployment in time while 
being more appropriate than immediate R&D into these tech-
nologies at the same time. 
3) There are more appropriate alternatives to immediate R&D into 
the CE technology T under the aspect R which bring about that 
T is ready in time.  
4) THUS (from 1-3): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought not to be carried out (immediately).  
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A7 SPECIALISATION 
1) A goal-oriented action A may be carried out only if each of the 
following conditions is met: 1. There is a chance of achieving 
the objective targeted by A; 2. The direct effort of action A is 
reasonable; 3. The objective pursued by the action outweighs, 
considering the probability that the objective be actually 
achieved, the expected certain, probable, and possible side-
effects; 4. The objective targeted by A is desirable. 
2) R&D into a technology is a goal-oriented action.  
3) The goal of R&D into a technology is to establish readiness for 
its deployment.  
4) THUS (from 1-3): R&D into a technology under the aspect R 
may be carried out only if each of the following conditions is 
met: 1. There is a chance of achieving readiness for deploy-
ment; 2. The direct costs of R&D are reasonable; 3. The readi-
ness for deployment of the technology outweighs, considering 
the probability that such readiness be actually achieved, the ex-
pected certain, probable, and possible side-effects of R&D; 4. It 
is desirable to have available an adequate technology ready for 
deployment.  
A8 OVERWHELMING NEGATIVE SIDE-EFFECTS 
1) One of the possible negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R is that any reshaping of and 
technical intervention into nature may become tolerated.  
2) One of the possible negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R consists in the serious impedi-
ment to mitigation.   
3) One of the possible negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R consists in the deployment of T 
without any central and democratic decision to do so.   
4) One of the possible negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R consists in the development of 
the CE technology T being controlled by big business instead of 
by democratic committees.  
5) One of the possible negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R consists in its unilateral de-
ployment.  
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6) One of the probable negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R consists in the necessity of car-
rying out large-scale field tests.  
7) One of the probable negative side-effects of R&D into the CE 
technology T under the aspect R consists in its promoting busi-
ness branches that are reactionary in terms of climate policies.  
8) The possible and probable negative side-effects SE1-SE7 clear-
ly outweigh the sum of all [certain, probable, and possible] use-
ful side-effects and the [probable] intended effect that technolo-
gy T is ready for deployment.  
9) If some of the possible and probable negative effects N out-
weigh the [probable] intended effect O plus all positive side-
effects P, then it is wrong that the side-effects of the relevant 
measure are, relative to the probable achievement of the objec-
tive, negligible. 
10) THUS (from 1-9): It is not true that: The side-effects of R&D in-
to the CE technology T under the aspect R are negligible as 
compared to T being [probably] ready for deployment in time.  
A9 MITIGATION OBSTRUCTION 
R&D into the CE technology T impairs efforts to avoid climate 
change. (Keith 2000:276; Gardiner 2010:292; Jamieson 1996:333 et 
seq.; Robock 2008a,b; ETC 2009:34) 
A10 UNSTOPPABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Research into CE might create an internal dynamic which inevitably 
leads to deployment even if deployment is dispensable. Yet, one 
must be able to halt R&D into risk technologies at any moment. 
(Jamieson 1996:333 et seq.) 
A11 COMMERCIAL CONTROL 
CE technologies might ultimately be controlled by big business that 
acts purely on the basis of commercial interest. This would lead to 
problems similar to those experienced in the pharmaceutical sector. 
(Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:29,34) 
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A12 FIELD TESTS 
R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R inevitably goes 
along with large-scale field tests which actually lead to deployment 
of T before T has been thoroughly probed. (Elliott 2010:11; Robock 
2010) 
A13 TECHNO ESCALATION 
R&D into CE may sanction technical interventions into nature on 
any scale whatsoever. (Keith 2000) 
A14 POLITICAL ECONOMY 
CE promotes the military-industrial sectors and the business 
branches that are the most reactionary in terms of climate policy. 
(Ott 2010a,b,d) 
A15 UNILATERAL DEPLOYMENT 
R&D into CE might lead to unilateral deployment with catastrophic 
impacts. (Goodell 2010:195-7) 
A16 INNOVATION ARGUMENT 
R&D into new technologies such as CE triggers spin-offs and cre-
ates jobs.  
1) As a possible positive side-effect, R&D into the CE technology 
under the aspect R might lead to the creation of spin-offs and 
jobs.  
2) The potential creation of spin-offs and jobs, together with the 
intended achievement of readiness for deployment, outweighs 
the possible and probable negative side-effects SE1-SE7.  
3) THUS (from 1, 2): It is not true that: The possible and probable 
negative side-effects SE1-SE7 clearly outweigh the sum of all 
[certain, probable and possible] useful side-effects and the 
[probable] intended consequence that the technology T is ready 
for deployment.   
A17 INTEREST GROUPS 
With larger sums going into CE R&D, lobby groups that tend to be 
opposed to ambitious mitigation policies will be established and 
strengthened. (Corner & Pidgeon 2010:30) 
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A18 CE HYPE 
R&D into CE could trigger an outright CE hype. And the discussion 
of CE alone could undermine the motivation of realising costly mit-
igation and adaptation policies.  
A19 UNDERMINING BETTER OPTIONS 
The financial and cognitive resources that are used for R&D into 
CE are not available for preparing and implementing mitigation pol-
icies. 
A20 EXTENT UNCERTAIN 
The strength and existence of a negative feedback from CE R&D to 
mitigation are uncertain. (Corner & Pidgeon 2010:31) 
A21 FALSE EXCLUSIVENESS 
CE and mitigation do not rule each other out. (Keith 2010) 
A22 NO NEED 
1) A future deployment of the CE technology T is in any case 
(morally) wrong.  
2) Given that the deployment of a technology is (morally) wrong 
in any case, it is not desirable to have available any whatsoever 
ready-for-deployment technology.  
3) THUS (from 1, 2): It is not desirable at all to have available at a 
future point in time a CE technology T that is ready for deploy-
ment.  
A23 LESSER-EVIL ARGUMENT 
SRM deployment, as compared to unstoppable climate change, may 
be the lesser evil.  
1) At some future point in time t, we may end up in a situation 
where (a) the worst possible impacts of the deployment of the 
CE technology T are clearly less severe than the worst possible 
consequences of not deploying it; where (b) relevant probability 
forecasts are not at our disposal; and where (c) the worst possi-
ble consequences of not deploying CE would in fact be cata-
strophic.  
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2) If relevant probability forecasts are unavailable and if the worst 
possible consequences of a decision are actually catastrophic, 
one should choose the option for action with the comparatively 
best worst possible consequences. (version of the precautionary 
principle)   
3) THUS (from 1, 2): At some future point in time t, we may get in-
to a situation where we should deploy the CE technology T.  
4) If we may get into a situation where a technology T ought to be 
deployed, the technology T should be ready for deployment in 
the future, provided that there are no more significant moral 
reasons against T being ready for deployment. (precautionary 
reasoning)   
5) There are no such more significant moral reasons against the 
readiness for deployment of the CE technology T.   
6) THUS (from 3-5): The CE technology T should be ready for de-
ployment at a future point in time. 
A24 CE AS CONSERVATION 
Deploying CE might be the only remaining possibility of saving 
certain ecosystems. (Keith in Goodell 2010:39) 
A25 ARGUMENT FROM SURVIVAL 
Unstoppable climate change might endanger the survival of the en-
tire human species. (Corner & Pidgeon 2010:32) 
A26 CATASTROPHIC SIDE-EFFECTS 
CE is not the lesser evil. (Gardiner 2010:291) 
1) It is certain that the future deployment of CE technologies might 
even worsen the most catastrophic anthropogenic climate im-
pacts instead of alleviating them.  
2) If an action A might bring about a further aggravation of the 
worst possible impacts of action B, the worst possible impacts 
of A cannot possibly be better than those of B.  
3) THUS (from 1, 2): It is certain that the worst possible impacts of 
the future deployment of the CE technology T are clearly worse 
than the worst possible impacts of not deploying CE.   
4) THUS (from 3): It is NOT possible that at a future point in time t 
we end up in a situation, where the worst possible impacts of 
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the deployment of the CE technology T are clearly less severe 
than the worst possible impacts of not deploying CE.  
5) THUS (from 4): It is NOT possible that at a future point in time t 
we end up in a situation, where (a) the worst possible impacts of 
the deployment of the CE technology T are clearly less severe 
than the worst possible impacts of not deploying it; where (b) 
relevant probability forecasts are not at our disposal; and where 
(c) the worst possible impacts of not deploying CE would in 
fact be catastrophic.  
A27 INTENTION MAKES A DIFFERENCE 
Intentional interventions into the climate system are (morally) much 
worse than unintentional ones. (principle of double effect) (Keith 
2000; Elliott 2010:18) 
A28 COMPENSATION 
In the case of compensation, intentional interventions are not worse.   
A29 INTENTIONAL HARM 
Deploying CE involves harming some (rather than other) people; 
this reduces the ethical value of our lives. (Gardiner 2010:304) 
A30 SICK-PATIENT ANALOGY 
The Earth could become a terminally ill patient whom we prescribe 
a highly risky, hardly understood therapy for seemingly being 
doomed to die anyway. (Lovelock in Goodell 2010:106) 
1) A terminally ill patient ought to be prescribed a highly risky 
therapy if such therapy is found to be the only treatment option.  
2) If, in the coming decades, greenhouse gas emissions remain un-
abated and if the climate sensitivity exceeds 6°C, the Earth, by 
about 2050, will resemble – in every relevant respect (especially 
as regards the fact that the situation cannot worsen) – a termi-
nally ill patient for whom the only treatment option consists in a 
highly risky therapy (i.e., in analogy, in the deployment of a CE 
technology).  
3) If two situations are equal in every morally relevant respect, an 
option for action in one of these situations ought to be taken 
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whenever the analogous option ought to be taken in the other 
situation.  
4) THUS (from 1-3): If, in the coming decades, greenhouse gas 
emissions should remain unabated and if the climate sensitivity 
should exceed 6°C, CE technology T ought to be deployed by 
about 2050.  
5) It is possible that, in the coming decades, greenhouse gas emis-
sions will remain unabated and climate sensitivity will exceed 
6°C.  
6) If it is possible to get into a situation where a technology T 
ought to be deployed, the technology T should be ready for de-
ployment in the future, provided that there are no more signifi-
cant moral reasons against T being ready for deployment. (pre-
cautionary consideration)  
7) There are no such more significant moral reasons against the 
readiness for deployment of the CE technology T.  
8) THUS (from 4-7): The CE technology T should be ready for de-
ployment at a future point in time. 
A31 NO ABSOLUTE BOTTOM LINE 
In contrast to a terminally ill person, who, at worst, dies, anthropo-
genic climate impacts, no matter how bad they are, can always be-
come worse.  
A32 READY CE TECHNOLOGIES NEEDED 
Only with the help of a ready CE technology T can the atmospheric 
CO2 level be reduced to 350 ppm. (Hansen 2009; Greene et al. 
2010) 
A33 CO2 LEVEL REDUCTION NEEDED 
The atmospheric CO2 level should be reduced to less than 350 ppm 
within this century.  
1) CO2 concentration, which is approximately 380 ppm today 
(2010), is sure to increase further in the coming decades.  
2) THUS (from 1): CO2 reduction is required to achieve that con-
centrations are stabilized at less than 350 ppm.  
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3) During the present century, CO2 concentration is not expected 
to decrease unless by means of appropriate technical interven-
tions in the climate system (i.e. the carbon cycle).  
4) THUS (from 2, 3): CO2 stabilization at less than 350 ppm re-
quires appropriate technical interventions to reduce concentra-
tions.  
5) In the course of this century, the atmospheric CO2 concentration 
ought to be stabilized at less than 350 ppm.   
6) If a situation S is to be avoided/achieved and if S can only be 
avoided/achieved by bringing about M, then M ought to be 
brought about.  
7) THUS (from 4-6): It is (imperatively) necessary that the atmos-
pheric CO2 concentration be reduced through technical inter-
ventions in the climate system.  
A34 AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 
We ought to avoid dangerous climate change (with a sufficiently 
high probability).  
1) We can only avoid dangerous climate change (with a sufficient-
ly high probability) if, in the course of this century, we succeed 
in stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 concentration at less than 
350 ppm.  
2) If a situation S is to be avoided/achieved and if S can only be 
avoided/achieved by bringing about M, then M ought to be 
brought about.  
3) THUS (from 1, 2): In the course of this century, the atmospheric 
CO2 concentration ought to be stabilized at less than 350 ppm.  
A35 CATASTROPHIC SEA LEVEL RISE 
1) A permanent CO2 concentration above 350 ppm threatens to 
cause disintegration of the continental ice sheets.  
2) Disintegration of the continental ice sheets would cause a con-
tinuous sea level rise on the order of several metres per century 
for the coming centuries.  
3) A continuous sea level rise of several metres per century would 
definitely destroy the coastal towns. (It is not possible to adapt 
to such sea level rises.)  
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4) A change of the climate system that leads to the destruction of 
coastal towns is a dangerous climate change.  
5) THUS (from 1-4): A permanent CO2 concentration above 
350 ppm threatens to cause a dangerous climate change.   
6) THUS (from 5): We can only avoid dangerous climate change 
(with a sufficiently high probability) if, in the course of this cen-
tury, we succeed in stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion at less than 350 ppm.  
A36 CLIMATE HISTORY 
Palaeo-climatic data testify that continental ice sheets might disinte-
grate at slightly higher global temperatures than today.  
A37 MASS EXTINCTIONS 
1) Global warming of even 2°C would shift and move the Earth's 
climate zones.  
2) A majority of the species would not be able to adapt to a shift 
and move of the climate zones within this century and would 
thus lose their natural habitat.  
3) Species losing their natural habitat will become extinct.  
4) A change of the climate system that leads to the extinction of a 
majority of the species is a dangerous climate change.  
5) THUS (from 1-4): Global warming of 2°C represents a danger-
ous climate change.  
6) We can only avoid global warming of 2°C (with a sufficiently 
high probability) if, in the course of this century, we succeed in 
stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 concentration at less 
than 350ppm.  
7) THUS (from 5, 6): We can only avoid dangerous climate change 
(with a sufficiently high probability) if, in the course of this cen-
tury, we succeed in stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion at less than 350 ppm.  
A38 WORST-CASE CLIMATE SENSITIVITY 
1) Climate sensitivity may well exceed 4 K, without us being able 
to reliably estimate the probability thereof.   
2) If climate sensitivity may well exceed 4 K, without us being 
able to reliably estimate the probability thereof, global warming 
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of significantly more than 2°C can only be avoided (with a suf-
ficiently high probability) if the radiation budget of the Earth is 
being balanced without delay.   
3) Global warming of significantly more than 2°C would represent 
a dangerous climate change.  
4) THUS (from 1-3): We can only avoid dangerous climate change 
(with a sufficiently high probability) if  we succeed in balancing 
the radiation budget of the Earth without delay.  
5) To balance the radiation budget of the Earth without delay, the 
CO2 concentration needs to be stabilized at less than 350 ppm in 
the course of this century.  
6) THUS (from 4, 5): We can only avoid dangerous climate change 
(with a sufficiently high probability) if, in the course of this cen-
tury, we succeed in stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion at less than 350 ppm.  
A39 EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT 
The direct and indirect costs of CE deployment are clearly below 
those of mitigation and adaptation. (Ott 2010a,b,d; Gardiner 
2010:287; Elliott 2010:20; Wood in Goodell 2010:129) 
A40 DO-IT-ALONE ARGUMENT 
If necessary, CE technologies can be deployed by a small group of 
determined nations to the benefit of the entire world. (Ott 
2010a,b,d) 
A41 EASINESS ARGUMENT 
CE allows avoiding dangerous climate change without changing life 
styles, habits, and the current mode of our economy. (Ott 2010a,b,d) 
A42 ONLY PARTIAL OFFSET 
The CE method T often neutralises only a fraction of all anthropo-
genic climate impacts; e.g. not ocean acidification. In principle, its 
benefits are obviously smaller than those of mitigation. (Gardiner 
2010:288; Robock 2008a,b; ETC 2009:19) 
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A43 INDIRECT COSTS UNDERESTIMATED 
The CE method T is anything but cheap, if one considers all indirect 
costs that arise due to unintended side-effects (Gardiner 2010:288) 
A44 HARMING OTHERS 
We do not compensate for harming others by merely providing 
them with technologies which might be used to moderate the harm 
we have caused. (Gardiner 2010:293) 
A45 TERMINATION PROBLEM 
CE measures do not possess viable exit options. If deployment is 
terminated abruptly, rapid and catastrophic climate change ensues. 
(Ott 2010a,b,d; Robock 2008a,b) 
A46 NO LONG-TERM CONTROL 
Our social systems and institutions are possibly not capable of con-
trolling risk technologies on long time scales and of ensuring that 
they are handled with proper technical care.  (Corner & Pidgeon 
2010:31) 
A47 NO IRREVERSIBLE INTERVENTIONS 
CE represents an irreversible intervention.  
A48 RETAINING OPTIONS 
Irreversible interventions narrow the options of future generations in 
an unacceptable way. (Jamieson 1996:330 et seq.) 
A49 UNSEEN SIDE-EFFECTS 
As long as the side-effects of CE technologies cannot be reliably 
predicted, their deployment is morally wrong. (Jamieson 1996:326 
et seq.; ETC 2009:34) 
1) It is not true that: Further R&D into the CE technology T may 
(a) ensure its effectiveness and (b) exclude catastrophic side-
effects of its deployment.  
2) If further R&D into the CE technology T cannot exclude cata-
strophic side-effects of its deployment for sure, then side-effects 
of deployment cannot be predicted reliably at any future point in 
time.  
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3) As long as the side-effects of a risk technology cannot be relia-
bly predicted, its deployment is morally wrong.  
4) The CE technology T is a risk technology.  
5) THUS (from 1-4): The future deployment of the CE technology 
T is in any case (morally) wrong.  
A50 MITIGATION, TOO 
Mitigation, too, is at least to some extent an irreversible intervention 
with unseen side-effects. (Corner & Pidgeon 2010:28) 
A51 NEVER PERFECT FORESIGHT 
We do never completely foresee the consequences of our actions. 
(Goodell 2010:135) 
A52 IRREDUCIBLE UNCERTAINTIES 
There are major irreducible uncertainties regarding the effectiveness 
and side-effects of CE deployment. (Keith 2000:277; Robock 
2008a; Bunzl 2009) 
1) There are major irreducible uncertainties regarding the effec-
tiveness and side-effects of CE deployment.  
2) Irreducible uncertainties cannot be reduced through further 
R&D.  
3) If uncertainties regarding the effectiveness and side-effects can-
not be reduced, neither can effectiveness be guaranteed nor can 
catastrophic side-effects be excluded.  
4) THUS (from 1-3): It is not true that: Further R&D into the CE 
technology T may (a) ensure its effectiveness and (b) exclude 
catastrophic side-effects of its deployment.  
A53 PREDICTIVE PROGRESS POSSIBLE 
Scientific research might advance our understanding so that we will 
be in a position, when actually deploying CE, to robustly rule out 
the worst case that CE aggravates climate impacts.  
1) Further R&D into the CE technology T may (a) ensure its effec-
tiveness and (b) exclude catastrophic side-effects of its deploy-
ment.  
2) If CE effectiveness was ensured and catastrophic side-effects of 
its deployment could be excluded, the deployment of CE tech-
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nologies could not further aggravate the worst possible anthro-
pogenic climate impacts.  
3) THUS (from 1, 2): It is possible that the future deployment of the 
CE technology T cannot further aggravate the worst possible 
anthropogenic climate impacts.   
4) THUS (from 3): It is NOT certain that the future deployment of 
CE technologies might aggravate the worst possible anthropo-
genic climate impacts instead of mitigating them.  
A54 IT MIGHT GET WORSE 
In the worst case (which is the decisive one), CE aggravates cata-
strophic climate impacts.  
1) It is certain that the future deployment of CE technologies might 
even worsen the most catastrophic anthropogenic climate im-
pacts instead of alleviating them.  
2) There are no relevant probability forecasts available regarding 
the impacts of a future deployment of CE technologies.   
3) If relevant probability forecasts are unavailable and if the worst 
possible consequences of a decision are actually catastrophic, 
one should choose the option for action with the comparatively 
best worst possible consequences. (version of the precautionary 
principle)  
4) THUS (from 1-3): The CE technology T should not be deployed 
in the future.  
5) THUS (from 4): A future deployment of the CE technology T is 
in any case (morally) wrong.  
A55 HUMAN ERROR 
Complex technical interventions which are sustained on longer time 
scales are susceptible to human error and are hence unpredictable. 
(Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:34) 
A56 COMPLEXITY OF EARTH SYSTEM 
As a consequence of the earth system's complexity, we will never 
be in a position to grasp, let alone quantify, all side-effects of large-
scale interventions. (Grunwald 2010; ETC 2009:34) 
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A57 LARGE-SCALE FIELD TESTS 
Only large-scale field tests, which effectively amount to full-fledged 
deployment, can robustly demonstrate the effectiveness and reliabil-
ity of CE methods. Hence, we will know whether CE works only 
once we have deployed it. (Robock 2010) 
A58 SOCIO-POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES 
The effectiveness and reliability of CE presuppose a stable institu-
tional framework over several decades. Such boundary conditions 
are unpredictable.  
A59 SHORT DEPLOYMENT CONCEIVABLE 
In case mitigation efforts are carried out and highly effective CDR 
methods are available, SRM might be deployed for no longer than a 
decade. (Wigley in Goodell 2010:133) 
A60 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
The uneven distributions of regional climate offsets (benefit), costs, 
and negative side-effects that go along with a CE deployment are 
deeply unjust. (Keith 2000:276; Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:34) 
A61 CAPABILITIES (SEN/NUSSBAUM) 
CE deployment will bring about that less people possess elementary 
capabilities to lead a successful, good, flourishing human life. 
(Sen/Nussbaum 1993) 
A62 DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE (RAWLS) 
CE deployment will even aggravate the situation of those who are 
globally already worst off. (Rawls 1975) 
A63 EGALITARIANISM 
CE deployment widens the existing global socio-economic inequali-
ties instead of reducing them.  
A64 HUMAN RIGHTS (POGGE) 
CE deployment alters the global institutional and economic condi-
tions such that human rights will be realised to a lesser degree. 
(Pogge 2002) 
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A65 OVERCOMING GLOBAL OPPOSITION 
Getting global legitimisation (in terms of factual consent and ac-
ceptance) for CE deployment is no less difficult than winning broad 
support for mitigation; if the former could be achieved, global miti-
gation efforts would not be blocked anymore and the prime reason 
for CE would fade away. (Gardiner 2010:294) 
A66 RISK OF HIGH CLIMATE SENSITIVITY 
Even with ambitious mitigation policies, we might fail to achieve 
the two-degree target such that CE deployment is the lesser of two 
evils. (Keith 2010) 
A67 IMPEDIMENT TO MITIGATION 
The deployment of CE makes it highly unlikely that far-reaching 
mitigation policies are implemented and sustained. 
A68 AMORTIZATION EFFECT 
Significant investments, required by capital-intensive CE technolo-
gies upfront, will amortize only in case the technology is deployed 
for a sufficiently long period of time. This requires not reducing 
CO2 emissions too much.  
A69 DUAL USE 
The CE technology T may potentially serve as (the basis for) weap-
ons of mass destruction. (Keith 2000:275; Corner & Pidgeon 
2010:30: Goodell 2010:210-2; Robock 2008a; ETC 2009:34) 
A70 CLIMATE CONTROL CONFLICTS 
CE puts future generations in a position to control the climate. This 
ability generates new conflicts and might even bring about climate 
wars. (Hulme 2010:351; Robock 2008a) 
A71 NO RETHINK 
The deployment of CE prevents and postpones the urgently needed 
rethinking in our societies and the inevitable reforms of our econo-
mies. (Corner & Pidgeon 2010:32) 
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A72 EXPLOITATION 
CE is just a cover for our ongoing exploitation of other people, gen-
erations, and species. (Gardiner 2010:304) 
A73 TECHNICAL FIX 
CE is a “technical fix”, tinkering with symptoms instead of resolv-
ing the causes. As such, it is fundamentally flawed. (Keith 2000; 
Gardiner 2010:303; ETC 2009:5) 
A74 RULING NATURE 
CE methods are but another means for ruling nature and point into a 
fundamentally wrong direction. (Gardiner 2010:288) 
A75 HUBRIS ARGUMENT 
CE belongs to a tradition of large-scale interventions which have 
ignored the boundaries of technical manipulation. It testifies to ar-
rogance and a form of self-deceit that will heavily backfire. (Ott 
2010a,b,c,d; Gardiner 2010:303; Jamieson 1996:332) 
A76 LOSS OF INTANGIBLE 
The deployment of CE triggers a loss of wilderness, originality, and 
intangibility on unprecedented scales. (Ott 2010a,b,d; Keith 
2000:277 et seq.; Robock 2008a) 
A77 ELEMENTARY FAILURE 
CE testifies that mankind has failed to meet an elementary chal-
lenge: To live and to survive on this planet as we have found it. 
(Gardiner 2010:304; Jamieson 1996:332) 
A78 CONCEPTION OF OURSELVES 
CE risks undermining our conception of ourselves as moral beings: 
What does the decision to implement CE or research into it tell 
about us? What are the humans like that make such decisions? 
Which are the virtues that may guide their actions? (Gardiner 
2010:303) 
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A79 CONTEMPT FOR THE GIVEN  
By deploying the CE technology T, we would not perceive and re-
spect nature as what is given to humans; rather, nature would be-
come something we create intentionally by way of technical repro-
duction. (According to Zimmerli et al. 1997, III.1) 
A80 BETRAYAL OF THE DEVINE CREATION 
By deploying the CE technology T, man subjects the Earth without 
restraint to his will and betrays its prior God-given purpose. (Ac-
cording to Pope John Paul II, Centesimus annus, IV, 37; WCC 
1998) 
A81 AVOIDING HASTY CE DEPLOYMENT 
1) Hasty deployment of the CE technology T should be avoided.  
2) Immediate R&D under the aspect R [probably] brings about that 
hasty deployment of the CE technology T is avoided.  
3) There are no alternative measures which bring about that hasty 
deployment of the CE technology T is avoided while at the 
same time being more appropriate than immediate R&D into 
CE under the aspect R.   
4) The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R are negligible as compared to [probably] avoiding its 
hasty deployment.  
5) R&D into a technology ought to be carried out immediately if 
the following conditions are met: 1. Hasty deployment of the 
technology should be avoided; 2. Immediate R&D [probably] 
brings about that hasty deployment of the CE technology T is 
avoided; 3. There are no alternative measures which bring about 
that hasty deployment of the technology is avoided while at the 
same time being more appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The 
side-effects of R&D are negligible as compared to [probably] 
avoiding hasty deployment of the technology.  
6) THUS (from 1-5): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought to be carried out.  
A82 SPECIALISATION 
1) An action A ought to be carried out if the following conditions 
are met: 1. The objective O ought to be realised; 2. A [probably] 
 126 
brings about realisation of O; 3. There is no alternative action A' 
that would bring about realisation of O while at the same time 
being more appropriate than A; 4. The side-effects of A are neg-
ligible as compared to O [probably] being realised.  
2) THUS (from 1): R&D into a technology ought to be carried out 
immediately if the following conditions are met: 1. Hasty de-
ployment of the technology should be avoided; 2. Immediate 
R&D [probably] brings about that hasty deployment of the CE 
technology T is avoided; 3. There are no alternative measures 
which bring about that hasty deployment of the technology is 
avoided while at the same time being more appropriate than 
immediate R&D; 4. The side-effects of R&D are negligible as 
compared to [probably] avoiding hasty deployment of the tech-
nology.  
A83 FOSTERING MITIGATION 
By highlighting limits of CE, R&D will underline the importance of 
mitigation and avoid that CE is still implicitly relied on. (Keith 
2010; Lovelock in Goodell 2010:107) 
1) Mitigation should be fostered.  
2) Immediate R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R 
[probably] brings about fostering of mitigation.  
3) There are no alternative measures which bring about fostering 
of mitigation while at the same time being more appropriate 
than immediate R&D into CE under the aspect R.  
4) The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R are negligible as compared to [probably] fostering mit-
igation.  
5) R&D into a technology ought to be carried out immediately if 
the following conditions are met: 1. Mitigation should be fos-
tered; 2. Immediate R&D [probably] brings about fostering of 
mitigation; 3. There are no alternative measures which bring 
about fostering of mitigation while at the same time being more 
appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The side-effects of R&D 
are negligible as compared to [probably] fostering mitigation.  
6) THUS (from 1-5): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought to be carried out.  
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A84 SPECIALISATION 
1) An action A ought to be carried out if the following conditions 
are met: 1. The objective O ought to be realised; 2. A [probably] 
brings about realisation of O; 3. There is no alternative action A' 
that would bring about realisation of O while at the same time 
being more appropriate than A; 4. The side-effects of A are neg-
ligible as compared to O [probably] being realised.  
2) THUS (from 1): R&D into a technology ought to be carried out 
immediately if the following conditions are met: 1. Mitigation 
should be fostered; 2. Immediate R&D [probably] brings about 
fostering of mitigation; 3. There are no alternative measures 
which bring about fostering of mitigation while at the same time 
being more appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The side-
effects of R&D are negligible as compared to [probably] foster-
ing mitigation.  
A85 PLANNING LONG-TERM R&D STRATEGY 
1) The long-term strategy for R&D into the CE technology T 
should be prepared.  
2) Immediate R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R 
[probably] brings about preparation of the long-term strategy for 
R&D into the CE technology T.   
3) There are no alternatives to immediate R&D into the CE tech-
nology T under the aspect R which bring about preparation of 
the long-term strategy for research into the CE technology T 
while at the same time being more appropriate than immediate 
R&D.  
4) The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R are negligible as compared to [probably] preparing the 
long-term strategy for R&D into the CE technology T. 
5) R&D into a technology under the aspect R ought to be carried 
out immediately if the following conditions are met: 1. The de-
cision on the long-term R&D strategy should be prepared; 2. 
Immediate R&D [probably] brings about preparation of the de-
cision on the long-term R&D strategy; 3. There are no alterna-
tive measures which bring about preparation of the decision on 
the long-term R&D strategy while at the same time being more 
appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The side-effects of R&D 
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are negligible as compared to [probably] preparing the decision 
on the long-term R&D strategy.   
6) THUS (from 1-5): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought to be carried out.  
A86 SPECIALISATION 
1) An action A ought to be carried out if the following conditions 
are met: 1. The objective O ought to be realised; 2. A [probably] 
brings about realisation of O; 3. There is no alternative action A' 
that would bring about realisation of O while at the same time 
being more appropriate than A; 4. The side-effects of A are neg-
ligible as compared to O [probably] being realised.  
2) THUS (from 1): R&D into a technology under the aspect R 
ought to be carried out immediately if the following conditions 
are met: 1. The long-term R&D strategy should be prepared; 2. 
Immediate R&D [probably] brings about preparation of the de-
cision on the long-term R&D strategy; 3. There are no alterna-
tive measures which bring about preparation of the decision on 
the long-term R&D strategy while at the same time being more 
appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. The side-effects of R&D 
are negligible as compared to [probably] preparing the decision 
on the long-term R&D strategy.  
A87 PREPARING INFORMED DECISION 
1) At a future point in time, we should be able to make best-
informed decisions on the deployment of the CE technology T.  
2) Immediate R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R 
[probably] brings about the ability to make best-informed deci-
sions on the deployment of the CE technology T.  
3) There are no alternatives to immediate R&D into the CE tech-
nology T under the aspect R which bring about the ability to 
make best-informed decisions on the deployment of the CE 
technology while at the same time being more appropriate than 
immediate R&D.  
4) The side-effects of R&D into the CE technology T under the 
aspect R are negligible as compared to [probably] being able to 
make best-informed decisions on the deployment of the CE 
technology T.  
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5) R&D into a technology under the aspect R ought to be carried 
out immediately if the following conditions are met: 1. We 
should be able to make best-informed decisions on the deploy-
ment of a technology; 2. Immediate R&D [probably] brings 
about the ability to make best-informed decisions on the de-
ployment of the CE technology T; 3. There are no alternative 
measures which bring about the ability to make best-informed 
decisions on the deployment of the CE technology T while at 
the same time being more appropriate than immediate R&D; 4. 
The side-effects of R&D are negligible as compared to [proba-
bly] being able to make best-informed decisions on the deploy-
ment of the CE technology T.  
6) THUS (from 1-5): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought to be carried out.  
A88 SPECIALISATION 
1) An action A ought to be carried out if the following conditions 
are met: 1. The objective O ought to be realised; 2. A [probably] 
brings about realisation of O; 3. There is no alternative action A' 
that would bring about realisation of O while at the same time 
being more appropriate than A; 4. The side-effects of A are neg-
ligible as compared to O [probably] being realised.  
2) THUS (from 1): R&D into a technology under the aspect R 
ought to be carried out immediately if the following conditions 
are met: 1. We should be able to make best-informed decisions 
on the deployment of a technology; 2. Immediate R&D [proba-
bly] brings about the ability to make best-informed decisions on 
the deployment of the CE technology T; 3. There are no alterna-
tive measures which bring about the ability to make best-
informed decisions on the deployment of the CE technology T 
while at the same time being more appropriate than immediate 
R&D; 4. The side-effects of R&D are negligible as compared to 
[probably] being able to make best-informed decisions on the 
deployment of the CE technology T.  
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A89 R&D FIRST 
R&D should not be constrained; once technologies have been de-
veloped, a decision can be taken as to their deployment. (Gardiner 
2010:288 et seq.) 
A90 R&D NO GOAL IN ITSELF 
R&D is no intrinsic goal and not for free, either: Research projects 
compete for limited funds, requiring a choice as to which projects to 
pursue. (Gardiner 2010:288 et seq.; Jamieson 1996:333 et seq.) 
A91 R&D RELATED TO APPLICATIONS 
R&D cannot be separated neatly from its potential results' applica-
tions because of psychological as well as socio-economic mecha-
nisms. Frequently, automatic applications cannot be avoided. (Gar-
diner 2010:288 et seq.) 
A92 TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL 
The CE technology T is, in itself, neutral and may be applied for 
good or bad purposes. Its mere development cannot reasonably be 
prohibited. (Goodell 2010) 
A93 POSTPONE R&D 
Preparing a technical intervention which is to be carried out in 50 
years is a waste of resources: The technological means upon which 
the intervention will ultimately rely are not available today at all. 
(Gardiner 2010:288 et seq.) 
A94 MORATORIUM 
Hasty and premature deployment of CE technologies might be 
avoided (alternatively) by an international moratorium.  
A95 CLANDESTINE RESEARCH 
A moratorium would merely push research activities "under-
ground". (Goodell 2010:200) 
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A96 RISK TRANSFER ARGUMENT 
Planning for deployment and carrying out R&D today means trans-
ferring risks to future generations. (Ott 2010a,b,d; Gardiner 
2010:293; Jamieson 1996:331) 
A97 NO INFORMED CONSENT 
R&D into CE requires a broad and well-informed consent of those 
potentially affected, which is not given. (Jamieson 1996:329 et seq.; 
Ott 2010a,b,d; Gardiner 2010:293 et seq.; Elliott 2010:19) 
A98 TRUE MOTIVES 
R&D into CE is but a rationalization for "passing the buck" on to 
future generations and for not addressing the CO2 problem in ear-
nest. (cf. Gardiner 2010:295) 
A99 DILEMMA GENERATION 
R&D into CE is likely to lead to future dilemmata. (Ott 2010c) 
1) R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R might lead to 
a future situation, where (a) atmospheric CO2 concentrations are 
very high, (b) the CE technology T is the only measure de-
ployed to compensate such high CO2 concentrations, and (c) the 
deployment of the CE technology T entails unforeseen conse-
quences which imply that continued deployment of the CE 
technology T would cause global evils.   
2) In a situation, where (a) atmospheric CO2 concentrations are 
very high, (b) the CE technology T is the only measure de-
ployed to compensate such high CO2 concentrations, and (c) the 
deployment of the CE technology T entails unforeseen conse-
quences which imply that continued deployment of the CE 
technology T would cause global evils, (i) decisions need to be 
made in favour of or against abandonment of the deployment of 
the respective technology T, (ii) equally good reasons exist for 
deciding in favour of or against abandonment, and (iii) any al-
ternative action leads to a global misfortune.     
3) THUS (from 1, 2): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R might lead to a future situation, where (i) decisions need 
to be made in favour of or against abandonment of the deploy-
ment of the respective technology T, (ii) equally good reasons 
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exist for deciding in favour of or against abandonment, and (iii) 
any alternative action leads to a global misfortune.  
4) A situation S is globally dilemmatic if (i) in S, one has to decide 
between one of two alternative actions excluding one another, 
(ii) equally good reasons exist for each action alternative, and 
(iii) any alternative action leads to a global misfortune.  
5) THUS (from 3, 4): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R might lead to a globally dilemmatic situation.  
6) An action which might lead to a globally dilemmatic situation is 
prohibited if there are better alternatives.  
7) There are better alternatives than R&D into the CE technology 
T under the aspect R.  
8) THUS (from 5-7): R&D into the CE technology T under the as-
pect R ought not to be carried out (immediately).  
A100 AGAINST DILEMMA GENERATION 
1) Actions that may curb the rights of (future) persons are prohib-
ited as long as omission of the respective action does not de-
mand too much of the agent involved.  
2) Humans have a right to autonomy and self-determination.  
3) Autonomy and self-determination essentially depend on the 
possibility of persons to choose between basically good alterna-
tive actions.  
4) THUS (from 2-3): Humans have a right to choose between basi-
cally good alternative actions.  
5) THUS (from 1,4): Actions that may bring about that (future) per-
sons can only choose between bad actions are prohibited as long 
as omission of the respective action does not demand too much 
of the agent involved.  
6) The omission of an action does not demand too much of the 
agent involved if there are better alternative actions.  
7) A globally dilemmatic situation is a situation where agents can 
but choose between bad alternative actions.  
8) THUS (from 5-7): An action which might lead to a globally dil-
emmatic situation is prohibited if there are better alternative ac-
tions.  
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A101 DISCRIMINATING PROHIBITIONS UNJUST 
1) R&D into the CE technology T under the aspect R ought not to 
be carried out (immediately).  
2) Some nations and businesses get away with defying R&D pro-
hibition.  
3) If an action A is prohibited (or morally forbidden) to all stake-
holders but some get away with defying the related rules, it 
seems unjust to uphold the prohibition for the remaining stake-
holders.  
4) Any prohibition whatsoever ought not to be unjustly upheld and 
imposed on any stakeholder.  
5) THUS (from 1-4): The prohibition of R&D into the CE technol-
ogy T ought not to be upheld towards, e.g., German or Europe-
an stakeholders.  
A102 ARGUMENT FROM REVERSIBILITY 
Changes in behaviour (induced by mitigation policies), are much 
more reversible than technical interventions. (Jamieson 1996:331)  
A103 AVOIDING DILEMMATA 
We should avoid upfront to end up in a situation where we are com-
pelled to choose between two evils. (Gardiner 2010:300 et seq.; El-
liott 2010:13) 
A104 POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE 
Problems should be solved by those (generations) who have caused 
them; therefore, mitigation is preferable to CE. (Jamieson 1996: 
331) 
A105 NO RESPECT 
An initial act of pollution would even be morally wrong if perfect 
neutralisation of negative impacts were possible ex post, because it 
is an expression of a lack of respect. (Hale 2009; Hale and Grundy 
2009) 
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A106 WORST CASE 
No matter whether CE technologies are carried out or not: The 
worst case, given mitigation policies are carried out, is comparative-
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favour of (the arming-the-future, lesser-evil, efficiency, 
easiness, innovation, and do-it-alone arguments) and against 
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This study investigates the ethical aspects of deploying and researching  
into so-called climate engineering methods, i.e. large-scale technical 
interventions in the climate system with the objective of offsetting 
anthropogenic climate change. The moral reasons in favour of and  
against R&D into and deployment of CE methods are analysed by  
means of argument maps. These argument maps provide an overview  
of the CE controversy and help to structure the complex debate. 
 
Arguments covered in this analysis include: The central justification of 
R&D; side-effects of R&D and of deployment; lesser-evil argumentation;  
two-degree target argumentation; efficiency and feasibility considera-
tions; arguments from ethics of risk; arguments from fairness; ge o- 
political objections; critique of technology and civilization; religious,  
existentialist, and environmental-ethics arguments; alternative justifi-
cations of R&D; lack of R&D alternatives; direct justifications of R&D 
prohibition; priority of mitigation policies. 
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